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Preface & Acknowledgments  
 
 
 
I first encountered anti-poverty policy, albeit indirectly, in a course entitled American 
Federalism in the Fall of 2014 with Professor Marc K. Landy.  We began the course with the 
Federalist Papers and Democracy in America; we finished the course with subjects such as 
‘No Child Left Behind’ and welfare reform.  It was the latter upon which I seized.   
 
To me, the politics of the welfare reform legislation of 1996 encapsulated timeless truths of 
American politics at both the state and national levels, and the underlying subject matter dealt 
with poverty and our collective response to it.  Thus, to me, welfare represented our national 
effort to improve the lives of low-income Americans and to address questions of the ‘common 
good’ within our political framework. 
 
However, the long story of cash-aid welfare, from the program’s inception during the New 
Deal to its radical re-constitution in 1996, is that government assistance must engage the values 
of security and opportunity as well as responsibility.1  From the 1980s, policy-experts and the 
public have begun to reflect the ageless understanding that productive activity describes what 
it is to be human.  And therefore, government assistance that does not depend, in some way, 
on a recipient’s contribution to the world around her is not only unfair, but also it demeans the 
‘whole person.’  This notion was critical in the transformation of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children – an entitlement cash dispersal program for low-income single-mothers – 
into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.  The program that endures under contemporary 
law is centered on a work requirement as a condition of aid, and it remains a pillar of our 
national effort to ensure that no citizen encounters destitution. 
 
I suppose it was both the subject matter as well as the politics of welfare reform that drew me 
to write the proceeding senior honors thesis.  I was enamored of the program’s transformation 
because it seemed to reflect the modus operandi of American policy-making:  define the 
objectives (e.g., require work, promote self-sufficiency, alleviate poverty); confine the political 
space; and, negotiate among the actors until a mutually palatable product emerges.  Amid 
congressional gridlock and fractious political parties, moments of bipartisan (even 
nonpartisan) greatness inspire the student of politics.  The policy formation process for welfare 
reform in 1996 suggested to me such a moment, when political currents converged with elite-
level consensus on program improvement so as to accord with values of opportunity, 
responsibility, and security.  Furthermore, this moment is of contemporary significance as well.  
It suggests that federal assistance programs, broadly speaking, must accord with the 
																																																						
1 See: Lawrence Aber et al., “Opportunity, Responsibility, and Security: A Consensus Plan for Reducing Poverty 
and Restoring the American Dream.” Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research/ Brookings Institution, 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Full-
Report.pdf. 
“consensus” described in this thesis, and it offers lessons about process.  For instance, 
successful policy formation occurs when public opinion aligns with elite opinion.  If this 
balance is off kilter, not only will the initiative fail to achieve its intended objective, but also 
it will be subject to continued politicization.  
 
I must thank several individuals who supported me in this project, as well as those who have 
been formative in my undergraduate education at Boston College.  To Dean Candace Hetzner, 
who will always be ‘Her Professorship’ to me, I owe immense gratitude for continued guidance 
and the suggestion of innumerable opportunities.  Professor Hetzner has offered her counsel 
on every major decision I have made since my freshman year.  She is shrewd and wise and 
will always have my praise.  To Professor Landy, who is something of a sage, I must thank for 
sparking my interest in American Politics and for honing my appreciation of the principles of 
federalism as articulated in the Founding.  He served me as a most astute thesis advisor.   
 
Also, it would be prudent to thank Ms. Julia Hughes of O’Neill Library for her helpful 
suggestions with respect to congressional testimony during the formation period of welfare 
reform.  Many thanks to my other academic mentors, who supported me along the way at 
Boston College: Professors Dennis Hale, Jennie Purnell, R. Shep Melnick, Eileen Sweeney, 
Aspen Brinton, Antonia Atanassova, and Harold Petersen. 
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 “Negotiating Welfare Reform:  A Conventional Narrative Re-Visited” 
Chapter I:  Introduction:  The Politics of Welfare and Reform 
 
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).  Its principal feature was recasting Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) – a 1930s ‘New Deal’ program designed to provide 
cash-aid predominantly to low-income single-mothers with dependents – into Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  The new law subjected recipients of cash-aid to a 
work requirement, permitted states to provide the provision of aid for a maximum of five years, 
and ‘block-granted’ the other aspects of the program to the states to encourage flexibility and 
innovation.  These three signature features, among many others, radically reconstructed the 
vision of the ‘safety-net’ and the provision of American welfare.  Some sharply criticized 
passage of PRWORA; some extoled comprehensive ‘welfare reform.’   
Despite the contentious debate that occurred in the Congress, one theory of the passage 
of welfare reform that continues to remain influential today is that of an overwhelming 
‘conservative backlash’ against government that occurred in the early- to mid-1990s.  On this 
account, public discontent for the status quo of the welfare system (government failure, more 
generally) combined with an issue movement to the right on the topic.  Political rhetoric focused 
on the growing caseloads, noting the number “on the dole.”  Caricatures of the “welfare queen” 
and “deadbeat dad” painted broad strokes on the program’s recipients.  Republicans overtaking 
the Congress in 1994, the “Contract with America,” and President Clinton’s overtures to “end 
welfare as we know it” are all central to this narrative. 
		 2 
However, this analysis of the reform that produced the complex legislation of the 
PRWORA is too simplistic, if not only “journalistic,” as Professor Lawrence M. Mead argues.1  
What I am concerned to do here is to present the policy formation process that eventually 
produced the finely-honed program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.  The 
conventional narrative of conservative backlash minimizes the extensive academic and policy 
elite guidance that coalesced on the particular features of reform that eventually became part 
of the legislation.  Welfare reform was inherently a political affair, but the content of the law 
cannot merely be understood as an issue movement to the right.  This seems to suggest that 
legislation represented mere Republican ideas.  The conventional account, in this way, does 
not see the policy innovations emanating from the states as sources of social science evidence 
that equally shaped university academics, think tanks, and Washington policy wonks, among 
others.  The conventional narrative is troubled, for example, to explain the fact that those 
testifying before Congressional committees focused on “paternalistic” topics of program 
improvement in greater proportion than on “progressive” topics of lessening (or heightening) 
the scale of government.2  The latter is a central part of the conservative backlash thesis.  
Yet, before addressing the contours of my study and its central arguments, it would be 
wise to provide an overview of what is meant by American ‘welfare’ and ‘welfare reform.’  
Equally so, I will provide a limited context of the constellation of forces in motion during the 
time of welfare reform.  These two pieces enable a presentation of the political analyses of 
																																																						
1 See:  Lawrence M. Mead (2006), “Welfare Politics in Congress: Hearings,” (Philadelphia, PA: Address to 
American Political Science Association). 
2 Ibid. Mead uses the terms ‘progressive’ or ‘progressivism’ to indicate scale-of-government, or otherwise the 
space in which the questions ‘How much should the government do?’ or ‘What role should the federal 
government have in x matter?’ arise.  I do not use this term, as it is often held as equivalent, in the popular 
lexicon, to the word ‘liberal’ or at least convokes the appearance of a politically left perspective.  To avoid 
confusion, I replace ‘progressive’ with the clearer signifier of ‘scale-of-government.’  See: Jordan A. Pino, 
“Negotiating Welfare Reform: A Conventional Narrative Re-Visited,” Ch. IV, ff. 13. 
		 3 
reform that are considered during the course of this study, as well as the additional topics 
explored.  Central to the argument of this thesis is understanding the ways in which the 
Congress, the White House, and the array of interest groups – from think tanks to religious 
organizations – negotiated the content of the legislation that ultimately passed. 
 
WHAT IS WELFARE REFORM? 
Far and away, ‘welfare’ was associated in the public mind with Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, at least since the 1960s.3  As mentioned above, AFDC was a ‘New Deal’ program 
that was implemented during the Franklin D. Roosevelt years.  It was passed within the 
behemoth Social Security Act of 1935, only one of several elements of the Democrat’s 
programmatic social insurance vision.  Originally, it was a tiny program that built on older 
“mothers’ pension” and “widows’ pension” schemes.4  It was designed to guarantee that the 
children of “decent, but destitute mothers” could avoid orphanage and be raised by their own 
mothers.5  But, in time it grew into the vast array of programs structured to provide services 
and benefits to poor families more generally.  This happened during the ‘War on Poverty’ of 
the 1960s – AFDC was realigned with other programs directed at low-income individuals, such 
as Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income.  Ron Haskins argues that in 
conjunction with the War on Poverty programs, the other “entitlements” of the Social Security 
Act, such as Unemployment Compensation, Disability Insurance, and the principal Social 
Security retirement program are all central to the American welfare system.6  However, I hold 
																																																						
3 R. Kent Weaver (2000), Ending Welfare as We Know It (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), p. 16. 
4 Ron Haskins (2006), Work over Welfare: The Inside Story of the 1996 Welfare Reform Law (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press), p. 4; Ibid.  
5 Weaver, Ending Welfare, p. 16.  
6 Haskins, Work over Welfare, p. 3. 
		 4 
that ‘welfare’ attained its definition (as the AFDC program) amid recognition by the American 
public that low-income families were receiving cash-aid without ‘sufficient requirements’ and 
amid public debate about how to address this problem with appropriate reform.   
Arguably, reform of welfare did not begin in the Congress, but rather in the courts.  
During the mid-1960s through the early-1970s, public interest attorneys started to use the court 
system to influence welfare policy.7  These attorneys exposed the gaps in the ways states 
treated AFDC’s target recipients, especially as it relates to eligibility requirements.  A good 
example of this development is so-called “man-in-the-house” rules, which eliminated or 
reduced benefits to an AFDC recipient when a male resided in the same domicile.  The courts 
held that this rule, in addition to residency requirements and several similar state statutes, were 
unconstitutional and, therefore, proscribed from law.  This is mentioned only to detail where 
welfare reform attained its political origins. 
As Kent Weaver notes, comprehensive, congressional welfare reform between 1969 
and 1995 is “largely a record of failure.”8  Beginning in the 1960s, all AFDC metrics saw 
explosive growth – caseloads, program outlays, and participation rates all increased.9  In 1960, 
there were 3 million individuals (parents and children) receiving AFDC funds; by 1971 there 
were 10.2 million recipients.10  These kinds of levels raised warnings of crisis, which prompted 
political efforts to address reform.  The first of these congressional efforts occurred in 1967, 
when the Congress created the Work Incentives Program (WIN).  It required states to register 
																																																						
7 Weaver, Ending Welfare, p. 17; This development of public law litigation is not confined to welfare policy.  The 
courts started to influence public policy on many topics starting in the 1960s and continuing today.  School 
desegregation is a related example of an area in which the courts have been particularly influential, issuing 
complex and continuing structural injunctions that enjoin specific results as a matter of law.  As it pertains to 
welfare, see: R. Shep Melnick (1994), Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press).  
8  Weaver, Ending Welfare, p. 54.  
9  Ibid., p. 55.  
10 Ibid.  
		 5 
mothers considered “appropriate” for training and employment as well as all fathers receiving 
AFDC benefits.11  However, the program suffered from poor enforcement – “few recipients 
were required to do anything beyond registering.”12  Thus, an early effort to reduce AFDC 
caseloads by encouraging work failed.    
At the beginning of the 1970s, President Richard Nixon adopted a reform proposal 
entitled the Family Assistance Plan (FAP), which provided a minimum income guarantee for 
all families with children of $1,600 (for a family of four).  Contingent upon this benefit was 
the requirement for recipients to participate in the AFDC-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) 
program, which subjected FAP families to a quasi-work requirement for ‘heads of household.’  
However, conservatives disliked the guarantee of income (despite its original influence from 
Milton Friedman’s Negative Income Tax proposal), and they considered the proposed work 
requirement too weak (there were to be implementation gaps that softened the work 
requirement). There was also a substantial “money trap” worry – FAP called for much higher 
federal spending.  In the end, it never cleared the Senate Finance Committee.13 
Welfare reform continued to flounder during the rest of the Nixon administration and 
during the Gerald Ford White House.  President Jimmy Carter, however, pledged to “clean up 
the welfare mess,” and in 1977 his proposal was revealed.  It was called the Program for Better 
Jobs and Incomes (PBJI), and it supported the replacement of AFDC, SSI, and food stamps 
with a “two-tier program providing different levels of income guarantees for those expected to 
work and those not expected to work.”14  The latter group was to be guaranteed an income of 
																																																						
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., p. 56.  
13 See ibid., pp. 57-60. 
14 Ibid., p. 62. 
		 6 
$4,200 a year for a family of four.15  The major difference between FAP and PBJI is that 
Carter’s program called for a huge investment in public service jobs for AFDC recipients and 
the poor more generally, “up to 1.4 million of them at the minimum wage.”16  Despite Carter 
enjoying majorities of his own party in both houses of Congress, members worried about 
‘moral hazard’ and ‘perverse incentives’ as well as the political implications of expanded 
benefits upon re-election.  House Speaker Tip O’Neill decided to send welfare reform to a 
designated ad hoc subcommittee to develop comprehensive legislation.  Ultimately, though, 
opposition from the more conservative Senate and lack of political will to support the 
contentious plan effectively killed the comprehensive effort.  During the last two years of the 
Carter administration, welfare reform only fared marginally better – tighter legislative control 
led to an “incremental and less expensive” strategy.17  However, the Senate again killed 
alternative plans that narrowly passed in the House.18 
When President Ronald Reagan attained high office, welfare reform entered a new 
stage.  In the 1981 “Budgetary Blitzkrieg,” the Reagan administration passed specific program 
rule changes and reduced federal spending on AFDC by about 13 percent.19  But, it was not 
until after 1982 that the Reagan administration developed a more dramatic proposal to reform 
welfare.  As part of his ‘New Federalism’ initiative, the Reagan administration proposed a 
program-swap with the states, where the federal government would assume responsibility for 
Medicaid (the fast-growing health insurance program for low-income families) in exchange 
for the states’ taking over responsibility for sixty-one federal grant programs.  AFDC and food 
																																																						
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 65. 
18 See ibid., pp. 60-6. 
19 Ibid., p. 68. 
		 7 
stamps were both central to this transition, and the plan emphasized Reagan’s belief in 
devolving authority to the states as well as reducing federal outlays even further.  Under New 
Federalism, AFDC was supposed to be a block grant to the states, where the contours of the 
program were largely within each state’s purview.  The plan never was approved by a hostile 
Congress, however.  Conservatives attacked the Medicaid takeover, and states resisted 
responsibility for AFDC and food stamps amid economic recession.  Advocates of the poor 
believed that Reagan’s devolution plan would ultimately lead to a ‘race to the bottom,’ where 
AFDC recipients would be left worse off.  Negotiations did occur (such as dropping food 
stamps from New Federalism), but by 1983 the welfare reform effort was dropped by 
Congress.  While the Reagan Administration continued to press for devolution and focused on 
“traditional moral norms of paternal obligation,” for instance, “the direction of change in 
AFDC policy had shifted modestly away from retrenchment.”20  Welfare reform would not be 
picked up again until President Reagan addressed the continued problems of welfare in his 
1987 State of the Union speech.21 
The Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) represents the last major effort to reform 
welfare before it was comprehensively and radically re-evaluated in the 1996 PRWORA.  
Weaver describes the FSA as a “masterful” attempt to maneuver through welfare policymaking 
traps, such as the “money trap” (spending greater federal funds represents a political and 
budgetary challenge to lawmakers) and the “dual clientele trap” (welfare policy reform 
attempts to enjoin adult recipients to accomplish specific tasks and results, but it tries not to 
harm dependents in the process).22  Specifically, the FSA proposed incremental shifts towards 
																																																						
20 Ibid., pp. 68-70. 
21 Ibid., pp. 66-70. 
22 Ibid., p. 78. 
		 8 
AFDC reflecting a work orientation, and not an entitlement.  And, lawmakers struck a number 
of compromises between the “contending approaches on how to achieve that goal.”23  This 
meant structuring a number of carrots and sticks to encourage AFDC recipients to enter the 
workforce.  An example of the former is provision of transitional childcare; the latter:  a ‘JOBS’ 
participation requirement for women and workfare for AFDC-UP fathers.24  JOBS is the Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills training program that replaced 1967’s WIN.  It attempted to 
move towards requiring AFDC recipients to work by enjoining states to provide such measures 
as jobs skills training, basic education, and transportation.25  Workfare refers to the requirement 
that Reagan emphasized throughout the legislative negotiation process that one parent 
(meaning the unemployed father in such cases) must participate for at least sixteen hours in 
community work experience to continue receiving benefits in AFDC-UP families.26 
Haskins takes a much more skeptical perspective on FSA’s success.  He notes that work 
encouragement (JOBS) is not the same thing as a work requirement – 95 percent of the AFDC 
caseload would have no true mandate to work.27  He claims that the JOBS program was 
insignificant at best:  only 1 percent of the caseload was employed or in a job search program 
by 1994.28  However, he does note that “the ice was beginning to crack.”29 
The FSA demonstrates the direction in which welfare reform was going, namely 
towards achieving the full work requirement.  It also comes close to representing policy 
formation in neat Hegelian fashion.  This is to suggest that past efforts offered lessons to 
																																																						
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 ‘AFDC-UP’ refers to the AFDC-Unemployed Parent program that provided welfare benefits to two-parent 
families in which the principal earner was unemployed. See ibid., pp. 70-8. 
27 Haskins, Work over Welfare, p. 12.  
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. 13. 
		 9 
lawmakers about “what works,” as well as to what other lawmakers were substantively 
committed.  Eight years after the FSA, comprehensive welfare reform would mean striking the 
right balance between requiring TANF recipients to work, moving towards self-sufficiency, 
and being generous enough on cash-aid and in-kind benefits to ease and encourage that process.  
 
CONTEXT OF THE 1996 REFORM 
Like welfare reform efforts of the past, the Congressional politics of PRWORA passage were 
fierce.  Early in the 1990s, Republicans focused on ‘tough’ positions to reform welfare.  They 
favored deterrence strategies (with the aim of deterring out-of-wedlock births) and mandatory 
work programs and lower benefits.  Democrats, by contrast, endeavored to increase benefit 
levels to relieve the pressures on families living in poverty; they focused on shaping state 
policies to better implement flexible work programs.  However, Weaver notes that in the early 
1990s, Congressional Democrats feared sending welfare improvement legislation to the Bush 
White House due to the threat of veto.30  Democrats gathered that the public was leaning 
towards hard-liner positions, so the failure of ‘soft’ legislation would largely hurt them, as 
opposed to Congressional Republicans or the Bush Administration.  Until Republicans 
overtook the Congress in 1994, little changes were made to welfare, despite the symbolic.   
Indeed, looming in the back of every legislator’s mind was the public mood.  Largely, 
the American people believed that the welfare system was broken.  Weaver documents that as 
much as 56 per cent of the public as far back as 1985 thought that public assistance ‘did not 
work well’; a majority also thought that it discouraged work.31  The polls in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s suggested that Americans not only thought that AFDC was not working well to 
																																																						
30 Ibid., p. 130. 
31 Ibid., pp. 126-7.  
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address the problems low-income families faced, but also that public assistance actually hurt 
the poor.32  And, 74 per cent of those asked in a 1992 poll believed that those receiving welfare 
were so dependent that they would never ‘get off welfare.’33  Interestingly, however, Weaver 
records that few respondents in 1991 and 1992 surveys considered welfare reform to be a ‘top 
issue.’34  Undoubtedly reassuring to many legislators, despite the public souring on the 
prospects of the AFDC program, a 1995 study noted that 93 percent of those polled believed 
that giving low-income individuals the tools they need to become self-sufficient was more 
important than reigning in the cost of the welfare program.35  The ‘public mood’ demanded 
legislative change on the topic, and it fostered a further politicization of welfare reform’s 
component parts.  The issue became such a ‘hot-button’ topic that targeted measures could 
produce political spoils; this helped to elevate it to the fore in the 1994 midterm elections. 
Coinciding with the deepening public discontent for the status quo and the 
politicization of welfare and its reform at the federal level, the states became the avenue for 
immediate, although modest and incremental, change.  Throughout the 1980s and during the 
early 1990s, the states enjoyed greater flexibility on the nature of their own welfare programs.  
State politicians’ main leverage was making adjustments to benefit levels and eligibility, 
enabling them to be seen as doing ‘something’ about the problems.  But, this leverage was 
fairly circumscribed.  It was not until the mid 1980s that states began to take advantage of 
waiver provisions under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, which enabled state 
politicians to test alternative and often dramatically revised programs.36  During this time, the 
																																																						
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., p. 126. 
34 Ibid. 
35 R. Kent Weaver, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “The Polls – Trends: Welfare,” Public Opinion 
Quarterly, vol. 59, no. 4 (December 1995), p. 611. 
36 Weaver, Ending Welfare, p. 131. 
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Department of Health and Human Services granted states the flexibility to implement measures 
such as “income disregards to family caps and time limits,” all “without any legislative change 
[…] by Congress.”37  However, discretion did not bring with it increased federal funds, at least 
until the Bush Administration removed the cost-neutrality provision for waiver-approved 
changes.38   
By 1995, a majority of states had been granted waivers for pilot projects.39  A 
particularly important consequence of waivers was that state politicians, including governors, 
found themselves in a position to transcend anti-welfare rhetoric and implement policies that 
addressed welfare’s problems.  Not always leading to successful initiatives, state waivers 
provided policy experts and federal legislators ample evidence for what does and does not 
work.  “Innovations” in states like Wisconsin and California are good examples of the 
politicization of welfare reforms, and also of initiatives that led to the achievement of policy 
priorities (such as reducing caseloads and moving recipients into work).40  Chapter III 
addresses evidence from the states, particularly from Wisconsin, to evaluate the paternalism 
thesis of welfare reform:  that policy-makers crafted PRWORA with “what works” in mind, 
not merely doing more or less for the poor according to benefit levels.  
Another important dimension of the context of comprehensive welfare reform to 
mention is the plethora of social science evidence available to influence policymakers and 
advisors alike.  In the mid- to late-1980s, several reports were issued that began to bolster the 
direction in which reform was headed.  Haskins notes that under the sponsorship of the Bradley 
and Olin Foundations, Michael Novak and Doug Besharov of the American Enterprise Institute 
																																																						
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., pp. 131-3.  
40 Ibid., p. 132. 
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proved especially influential in examining the problems and prospects of the welfare program 
and in shaping developed recommendations.  They organized a group called the Working 
Seminar, comprised of twenty policy elites (some with substantial government experience), to 
study welfare and make recommendations for its reform.  Center-left intellectuals like Robert 
Reischauer and Barbara Blum and center-right thinkers like Charles Murray and Lawrence 
Mead collaborated over the course of a year on a series of reforms (some radical), several of 
which ultimately found their way into the 1996 legislation.41   
Interestingly, reports from four other commissions that studied welfare and its 
reform — groups situated at various points along the political spectrum — all emphasized the 
same problems and recommended similar solutions.  The American Welfare Association, the 
Project on the Welfare of Families, the Task force on Poverty and Welfare, and the Low 
Income Opportunity Board all “stressed the connection between welfare benefits and 
reciprocal obligation by recipients,” and each addressed methods to improve ‘personal 
responsibility’ and ‘self-sufficiency.’42  Haskins resists claiming that there was a “consensus” 
on welfare reform by resting on a weaker thesis – both “liberal and conservative policy 
intellectual were convinced that welfare dependency and other behavioral problems were the 
major issues that had to be addressed by welfare reform.”43  I hold that this is a distinction 
without a difference, which will become central to my own study’s claim. 
Before think tank policy wonks narrowed in on the problems of welfare, other 
persuasive findings had already entered reform’s intellectual space.  Most importantly is 
perhaps the research of Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood of Harvard, who found in a 1983 
																																																						
41 See Haskins, Work over Welfare, pp. 12-4.  
42 Ibid., p. 14.  
43 Ibid. 
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statistical analysis that at any given time 65 percent of welfare recipients would spend (or had 
already spent) at least eight years ‘on the rolls.’44  This did much to substantiate conservatives’ 
concern that welfare recipients were becoming dependent on welfare, and even that it was 
becoming a ‘way of life.’  As Haskins illustrates:  this means that at the peak of AFDC’s 
caseloads in 1994, 3.5 million adults’ “spell” of poverty on the welfare rolls would eventually 
equal or exceed eight years.45  And, Bane and Ellwood’s work soon found its way into 
Congressional politics.  E. Clay Shaw, Jr. of Florida used their work in a pie chart on the House 
floor in the 1996 debate, and their studies were cited in the House Committee on Ways and 
Means’ Green Book – a comprehensive encyclopedia of social programs that Washington 
insiders “eagerly digested.”46   
Another important part of the context of welfare reform came from the Manpower 
Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC), that confirmed the thesis that Larry Mead had 
articulated in a 1986 book entitled, Beyond Entitlement.47  He contended that welfare 
dependency could be solved quite simply by aggressively administering programs that force 
the poor to adopt “appropriate behaviors.”48  This is the crux of the paternalism thesis for which 
he became (in)famous.  The MDRC, setting the standard for scientific and politically neutral 
analysis, found that welfare-to-work schemes significantly increased employment and earnings 
figures of welfare recipients, and led to decreases in caseloads.49 
																																																						
44 Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood (1986), “Slipping Into and Out of Poverty: The Dynamics of Spells,” 
Journal of Human Resources 21: 1-23.  
45 Haskins, Work over Welfare, p. 6.  
46 Ibid. 
47 See Lawrence M. Mead (1986), Beyond Entitlement (New York: The Free Press). 
48 Ibid.  
49 Haskins, Work over Welfare, p. 11; also see, Lawrence M. Mead (1997), The New Paternalism: Supervisory 
Approaches to Poverty (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press). 
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I will exempt other research, such as David Ellwood’s Poor Support50 or the studies of 
Harvard’s Christopher Jenks, from this introduction in the interests of space and efficiency.  
But, the important contextual point of welfare reform is established – increasingly research 
and analysis of America’s welfare system were coalescing on its problems and agreeing on the 
general direction of any reform.  By the time the Republican’s welfare reform was on President 
Clinton’s desk, even the New Republic urged his signature.51  As Haskins argues, “Seldom has 
social science presented a clearer case to policymakers.”52  
 
POLITICAL ANALYSES OF WELFARE REFORM 
Mead captures the perspectives of the politics of welfare reform best.  He suggests that existing 
research can be aggregated into three theories – welfare reform as backlash, as enforcement, 
and as elitist.  On the first view, backlash emphasizes all of the things mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter.  There was a conservative revolution in which constituents, 
increasingly disillusioned about the status quo, elected more conservative leaders to lessen the 
scale of government.  These constituents may have accepted the liberal vision of welfare of the 
1960s and early 1970s, but the caseloads had grown substantially since then; they lost patience 
with their leaders and the welfare system.  Again, this is the dominant theory in the literature.53  
Mead describes a number of problems with this account:  principally, his observation 
is that PRWORA did not try simply to do less for the poor; the scale of government was not 
merely decreased.  PRWORA involved ending the entitlement of cash-aid and implementing 
time-limits; but, it also increased federal spending on child care and wage subsidies.  Moreover, 
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Congress passed tougher federal standards to ensure states were doing their part to enforce 
work and child support requirements, while municipalities enjoyed greater authority on some 
other welfare policies.54 
The second account is enforcement, which centers on the new requirements of 
PRWORA.  Under this view, “the core dispute was not over the scale of government but 
whether welfare adults should have to behave well to get aid.”55  In the enforcement theory, 
reform was about decreasing dependency and caseloads primarily through tougher work 
requirements.  Mead claims that his books take this perspective. Also, Senator Daniel 
Moynihan, an influential participant in welfare politics and policy during this time, would 
subscribe to the enforcement theory.  His efforts to reform welfare focused on more generous 
benefits to low-income families, but he also agreed that paternalistic measures should be 
required for aid.  Like many of his colleagues, his legislative philosophy represented the view 
commentators often quipped as being ‘big government, but good government.’    
And, the third narrative is the elitist theory of welfare reform.  This conception sees 
itself within the changing beliefs of policymakers, advisors, and other thinkers in an Hegelian 
fashion.  As Mead succinctly describes, “In this view, welfare produced a technical debate 
focused mostly on the opportunity and paternalist issues,” which is to suggest that elites 
focused on asking the right questions and crafting specific programs to “make work pay” given 
the environment in which welfare recipients operated.56  This is the view I take in this study.  
My claim seeks to draw attention to the importance of elite influence on the policy formation 
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process – while not dismissing nor refuting the evident forces of ‘conservative backlash’ that 
brought Republicans to power again in 1994. 
 
THE CHALLENGE OF THIS THESIS 
As the political analyses above make clear, the objective of this present study is to substantiate 
a particular way of understanding the politics of the 1996 welfare reform law.  I see 
PRWORA’s passage as a product of conservative politics, sure; but the content of the 
legislation has a long history moving in the direction of:  work, respect for American 
Federalism and flexibility, as well as the provision of sufficient benefits.  I contend that elite 
policy convergence is a critical determinant of the formulation of PRWORA, political gain not 
excluded.  As has already been noted, the public mood fostered the opportunity as well as the 
necessity to do “something about welfare.”  The question was:  what exactly?  Conservatives 
and Democrats, White House and Congress, advocates and academics all negotiated the 
features that made up the law, and which elements would be left out, but available to the states 
on a voluntary basis.  Naturally, my task is to demonstrate that this occurred.     
Chapter II focuses on an elaboration of the conservative backlash account of welfare 
reform.  It further documents the political developments that substantiate this point-of-view, 
paying specific attention to Republican authorities.  I describe the significance of the ‘Contract 
with America’ and the Republican Congressional agenda, which actually was internally 
divided come 1996 about whether or not to push for welfare reform or to continue to structure 
it in such a way that President Clinton would be forced to veto (helping the Robert Dole 
campaign).57 
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Chapter III relies on the work of Lawrence Mead to articulate the ways in which welfare 
reform was paternalistic, and it pays attention to the evidence from the states, Wisconsin in 
particular, to discuss “what works.”58  Also, I build my argument further that elite pressures 
circumscribed reform to be of a certain kind and that any “success” of reform came to be 
defined in a particular way.  Evidence from Wisconsin is discussed for two reasons.  First, 
Governor Tommy Thompson’s efforts to reform welfare within his state largely preceded any 
other reform that was occurring nationally or in any other states.  Additionally, his 
conservative — and “good government” philosophy — brought with it paternalistic reforms, 
which emphasized work and obligation.  The positive results of such reform developed into a 
touchstone that legislators cited ad nauseam in the debates about PRWORA.  Secondly, 
perhaps more instrumental in its basis, Wisconsin remains the best studied state for welfare 
politics and policy, which is neatly developed in Mead’s book, Government Matters. 
Chapter IV more narrowly addresses the negotiations that occurred between the actors 
of welfare reform.  I begin by putting Mead’s analysis of committee hearings to use in 
understanding the shifts in testimony during the various phases of welfare reform since the 
1960s.  I present a few specific examples that help to ground Mead’s comments about 
ideological cooling and the shift towards ‘paternalistic’ considerations.  Additionally, I 
examine the role of the advocacy elites in the PRWORA formulation process, and I address 
social conservative groups as well as the Children’s Defense Fund.  Lastly, I contend that the 
nation’s governors exercised a decisive influence in shaping the reform legislation, promoting 
it, and then helping to revive it when it seemed that the budgetary negotiations between the 
Congress and the White House were at an impasse.  In Chapter IV, I endeavor to highlight the 
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extent to which PRWORA demonstrated an elite convergence on the necessity of a work 
requirement, but also I hope to make clear that the other features of reform – such as time 
limitation, “anti-illegitimacy” measures, childcare funding – were all matters open at the 
bargaining table. 
 In Chapter V, I conclude and review the central arguments of this thesis.  Overall, I 
seek to demonstrate that the public had aligned behind a reform law that, at least partially, 
looked like PRWORA.  For several years before the legislation came to pass, public opinion 
reflected the importance of a work requirement as a condition of assistance.  And yet, public 
opinion also was devoted to the provision of an adequate ‘safety net’ that could help low-
income families move towards self-sufficiency.  It was the intellectual and advocacy elites who 
frustrated reform until they, at least partially and broadly speaking, came to agree on the 
contours of reform’s content.  Despite this, welfare reform could not have occurred without 
the nation’s governors and their inter-governmental organizations, the Republican Governors 
Association and the National Governors Association.  The former helped to shape reform; the 
latter resurrected reform from the presidential veto’s graveyard.  By the final pages of the 
chapter, I hope to convince the reader that the conventional narrative of welfare reform’s 
passage – that a political analysis according to the backlash account is sufficient to be 
explanatory – fails to deal seriously with the legislation’s enormous complexities and the 
degree to which there was both a barebones consensus and substantial negotiation among the 
actors involved.   
*         *         * 
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“Negotiating Welfare Reform:  A Conventional Narrative Re-Visited” 
Chapter II:  PRWORA:  The Backlash Narrative 
 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the passage of welfare reform is often recalled as a story of 
conservative backlash.  In short, this theory suggests that souring public opinion of the cash-
aid welfare system promoted conservative politicians into office with the mandate of enforcing 
work requirements and time-limited aid, among other provisions that found their way into the 
legislation.  Backlash emphasizes general anti-government sentiment, and it explains the 
PRWORA policy formation process in a traditional political analysis.  This is to say that the 
content of “reform” was primarily a product of representative opinion – ‘giving the people 
what they want.’  As noted, this explanation is thoroughly journalistic, failing to grant due 
consideration to the complexities of welfare policy formation, which is not by necessity to 
suggest that it is false.1  Nevertheless, as Lawrence Mead has claimed, “about welfare, the 
significant debate has been among elites.”2  In an elitist account, welfare reform reflects what 
Hugh Heclo called ‘political learning’:  in which poverty and dependency represent problems 
to solve based on ‘what works’; in this way, policy formation is a sober and mature process 
characterized by tinkering and supported by social science evidence.3  This account notes the 
significant alignment that occurred on reform of welfare:  between the public and elites, as 
well as among the elites themselves.  
Before we can explore such a claim, a thorough understanding of conservative backlash 
theory is necessary.  This chapter documents the political developments that substantiate the 
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backlash account.  It begins with the Clinton Administration’s welfare reform efforts, then 
examines the Republican response – including the ‘Contract with America’ and the 1994 
midterm electoral revolution – and concludes with the eventual passage of PRWORA.  The 
final pages of the chapter explore what the theory fails to explain, which suggests the need for 
an additional, if not different, interpretation.  To encapsulate backlash theory, as it applies to 
welfare reform, Mead describes it in the following: 
On this view, the key division was the progressive [scale-of-government] one, 
and reform meant a movement to the right on that issue—toward smaller 
government. Traditional welfare had been formed in the liberal era of the 1960s 
and 1970s. But the rolls grew during these decades, and again in the early 1990s. 
Finally the public and its leaders lost patience with the poor and their advocates. 
They elected more conservatives to office. Once Republicans controlled 
Congress, they restricted aid and, to a large extent, “got it out of Washington.” 
Thus, guarantees of aid that had earlier been extended to the poor were 
withdrawn.4   
 
THE POLITICS OF BACKLASH 
When Bill Clinton assumed office in January of 1993, Democrats controlled both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate.  The new Administration scurried to set an agenda that 
placed the President’s health insurance initiative first and foremost, and welfare reform became 
the product of a task force “to be appointed.”  However, it was clear by the summer, when such 
a task force finally arose, that the Administration would “move more deliberately” on welfare 
reform.5  But, on the campaign trail, Clinton had made welfare too great an issue topic not to 
include it on the immediate agenda.  This was in no small part because of his rhetoric:  he 
tacitly acknowledged the failure of welfare policy under AFDC by promising to “end welfare 
as we know it.”  While bold, this angle had permitted Clinton to differentiate himself from 
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traditionally “soft” liberals as well as “tough” conservatives through a ‘New Democrat’ 
position.  What exactly this position was had been left to the safety of vagaries and sound-
bytes.  
When Clinton finally appointed the task force in the summer of 1993, it was plagued 
at the outset by presumption.  Delay had caused the media and many welfare policy 
commentators to understand Clinton’s stance as disingenuous.  Ron Haskins notes that 
aggressive political discussion during the election followed by six months of inaction led to 
heightened scrutiny of the task force’s progress.6  Everyone wanted to know what the president 
planned to do about welfare, and every update provided by the task force was viewed as paltry 
growth.  “Why isn’t the task force making more progress?” was the continued question that 
dogged its members.7 
While the speed at which the group developed the Administration’s proposal was called 
into question relentlessly, the competence of its membership was not.  The task force was 
comprised of such scholars as David Ellwood and Mary Jo Bane, two professors and welfare 
experts from Harvard, who were also serving in Donna Shalala’s Department of Health and 
Human Services.  Additionally, Bruce Reed, a Rhodes scholar and the president’s former 
deputy campaign manager and now domestic policy advisor, served on the task force as well.  
Each of these individuals, who collectively led the task force, was committed to the opinion 
that welfare as represented by AFDC was fatally flawed.  However, there was some 
disagreement among the members about the content of reform.  For example, Ellwood and 
Bane agreed that contemporary welfare policy structured perverse incentives that kept 
individuals from entering the work force; however, they disagreed with Reed’s ‘cut-a-deal’ 
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perspective, fearing that Republican pressures might lead Clinton to sign legislation that would 
put children at risk.8  The primary problem the task force encountered was disagreement such 
as this, which was a product of the range of positions within the Democratic Party.9  The 
ultimate proposal, which emerged eighteen months after Clinton took office, was radical 
enough to split the party, as the task force members’ commitment to reform differed from the 
commitments of the liberal wing of the party, which remained supportive of welfare as an 
entitlement, for example. 
Thus, at the outset, Clinton and his congressional supporters had two options.  One:  
they could produce a bill that contained enough provisions to command the full support of 
Democrats.  Or, two:  they could attract moderate Republicans in order to produce bipartisan 
legislation.  E. Clay Shaw, a Florida Republican of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 
told USA Today in 1993 that Clinton would not be able to pass welfare reform without 
Republicans, precisely because the public demanded such measures as time-limited benefits 
and mandatory work requirements, which the full Democratic coalition could not endorse.10  
As the task force continued to debate the Administration’s position on welfare reform, 
encountering such additional obstacles as expense (a March 1994 meeting between Clinton 
and the members offered proposals that ranged from $10 billion to $18 billion per year), House 
Republicans sensed an opportunity.11  Shaw in particular believed that Clinton’s campaign 
commitment to welfare reform was compatible with moderate Republican proposals.12  He 
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went so far as suggesting that moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans create a coalition 
to develop a serious welfare reform proposal.13  
However, most Republicans did not trust that Clinton was committed to the reform they 
believed had been proven by past experience, namely that work requirements were central to 
any legislation that would actually reduce dependency and improve the welfare of low-income 
families.  This perspective was not improved when Wendell Primus, a senior official in the 
Shalala Department of Health and Human Services, requested in testimony before the House 
Committee on Ways and Means in May of 1993 that the sixteen-hour workweek requirement 
for two-parent families receiving cash aid through AFDC be delayed for two years.  This 
provision was considered to be a substantial reform, demonstrating the “work, not welfare” 
perspective, which was passed in the 1988 Family Support Act.  Primus argued that the states 
“could not afford the programs that were ‘required’ to help welfare recipients get the education 
and training necessary to qualify for a job.”14  However, this annoyed Republicans who 
believed that work requirements were about work, not education. 15 This episode, in 
combination with the delay of the Clinton welfare task force, persuaded many House 
Republicans, especially on Ways and Means, to develop legislation on their own, to make the 
topic a much greater issue.  Partly, this reflects the representatives’ belief that now was the 
time for passage of reform legislation, but it also reflects their understanding that Clinton’s 
inaction (or worse: disingenuousness) would prove instrumental during the upcoming midterm 
election, if Republicans could show that they had a plan to fix welfare.  
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Recall that the public was well aware of the ensuing crisis over welfare.  Between 1966 
and 1976, the number of individuals on the welfare rolls swelled from 4.5 million to 11.4 
million.  There was relative stability until the caseloads exploded again in 1989, when over 
four years the number of adults and children on welfare reached over 14 million – a growth 
rate of nearly 30 percent.16  The large increases in the number of families on welfare is what 
brought dependency to the national attention, and therefore, to Bill Clinton’s and George Bush, 
Sr.’s attentions in the 1992 election.  Many conservatives cited the 1988 Family Support Act 
as a major cause of the increasing caseloads; they believed it did not do enough to require 
work, while spending more.17  And most conservatives looked to the states – especially 
Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Michigan – for innovative solutions in reducing caseloads while 
transferring welfare recipients from the rolls to the workforce.18  Chapter III discusses this 
influence in particular. 
So, amid Democrats’ infighting about the content of welfare reform, House 
Republicans on Ways and Means, initially led by Clay Shaw, sought to develop a proposal 
behind which all Republicans could unite.  There were simply too many uncertainties to try 
and develop bipartisan legislation at the outset.19  However, uniting Republicans proved to be 
a difficult task.  Many conservative intellectuals and policy wonks disagreed about the 
centrality of work requirements to welfare reform, as many believed that reform would consist 
in measures to fight “illegitimacy,” or unwed pregnancy.20, 21  Since Charles Murray’s 
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publication of Losing Ground in 1984, the number of children born to unmarried mothers 
(teens included) captured the attention of lawmakers across the political spectrum.  
Republicans in particular saw “illegitimacy” as a major public policy problem, one that 
coincided with the individual responsibility ethos of the party and its perspective on welfare 
reform.  This posed a challenge to the unification of Republican lawmakers, as solutions to 
fighting out-of-wedlock births differed drastically between Republicans and Democrats, for 
which moderates sought to focus exclusively on work requirements and time-limited 
benefits.22  These two poles – family formation and welfare recipient non-work – were drawn 
out in an earlier report produced by the Wednesday Group, a collection of Republican 
lawmakers who were tasked with the responsibility of developing a Republican position on 
welfare reform as early as 1991.23  Their initial and bold recommendation to end welfare 
entitlement and require work played a major part in later efforts in 1993 and 1994 to unite 
Republicans behind one set of reform measures.  
Despite increasing focus on teen and unmarried pregnancy, Shaw endeavored to reach 
an agreement that Clinton would be prepared to sign in order to change the law.  This 
characterized the Ways and Means perspective, from Shaw’s first welfare reform bill in 
February of 1993 through later iterations and ultimately to the final bill in August of 1996, 
when President Clinton signed PRWORA.24  However, other House Republicans and 
conservatives outside of Congress were more interested in stressing the critical distance 
between Democrats and Republicans on welfare reform, mostly for political gain.25  The frailty 
																																																						
of the term in order to express the understanding that it once (and perhaps, still does) hold an influence in 
welfare policy-making. 
22 Ibid., p. 26.  
23 Ibid., pp. 26-7. 
24 Ibid., p. 43. 
25 Ibid., p. 44. 
		 26 
of Republican unification was the single greatest challenge to reform throughout the legislative 
process.  And this was not aided by Shaw’s early departure from the Subcommittee on Human 
Resources to the Trade Subcommittee, in which he lost jurisdiction over leading welfare 
reform.  Rick Santorum, a young representative from Pennsylvania, generally considered more 
conservative than Shaw, took his place.  However, Santorum and Shaw turned out to work 
together quite closely on advancing a reform proposal with the ‘cut-a-deal’ perspective in 
mind.26 
On March 10, 1993, Republican unification behind Ways and Means’ efforts received 
a broadside challenge, when Jan Meyers, a determined Republican member from Kansas, 
introduced a bill that would have dismantled the AFDC entitlement through a block grant.  The 
Meyers proposal also eliminated aid to unwed teen mothers, in a direct expression of more 
conservative members’ concern to “fight illegitimacy.”  This provision was later called 
“Murray Light” by the Ways and Means Republicans, in a reference to Murray’s Losing 
Ground and his advocacy of eliminating all welfare benefits, period.27  Also, the bill was 
influenced in particular by Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation, which illustrates the 
impact think tanks and policy intellectuals would have on the reform debate – a point that is 
drawn out in later chapters.28  The central challenge was that this bill was poised to attract a 
critical mass of Republicans.  Haskins recalls how the Meyers bill gave a measure of what truly 
conservative reform could look like, and it put in jeopardy Republican unity around a work-
oriented piece of legislation that could be acceptable to moderate Democrats like Clinton.29 
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By May of 1993, Republican leaders were in agreement that there should be a working 
group appointed to smooth over the differences between Republicans on welfare reform and 
to develop a proposal that could be backed by the full party.  The work group was led by the 
new ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Rick Santorum, and the 
secretary of the House Republican Conference, Tom DeLay of Texas – hence the Santorum-
DeLay work group.  It also included Clay Shaw of Florida and Jan Meyers of Kansas, the latter 
reflecting the Lyndon B. Johnson adage: “It’s probably better to have [dissenters] inside the 
tent pissing out than outside the tent pissing in.”30  When the work group first met in June of 
1993, Santorum outlined five proposals he believed were a good place for the members to 
begin.  They included such measures as mandatory work requirements for mothers after two 
years on welfare as well as stronger child support enforcement.  After a breakfast meeting of 
the House Republican Research Committee, joined by Doug Besharov of the American 
Enterprise Institute, the Santorum-DeLay work group added a proposal to eliminate the ability 
of noncitizens (but, legal residents) to qualify for welfare benefits.31  Republicans considered 
the policy to be more than mistaken; they viewed it as fundamentally wrong.  The work group 
continued to develop proposals through civil discussion until a July 1993 meeting threatened 
its efforts.  Meyers believed that the two central features of her bill – converting AFDC to a 
block grant and eliminating aid to teen mothers – should be included in the work group’s 
recommendations.  However, the group judged that these measures were too controversial to 
unite the party.  Meyers decided to write to the Policy Committee to request that the 
consideration of the work group’s bill be delayed, as its topic was an “election issue” 
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anyways.32  Fortunately for the Santorum and Shaw contingent, her request was ignored, 
despite the fact that welfare reform did become an election issue.33 
These dynamics of the policy formation process within the Republican party are 
important to consider when understanding the backlash theory.  What is illustrated by the 
Santorum-DeLay work group, as well as earlier efforts, is that the welfare debate was in flux.  
As Haskins notes: “old views on welfare were rapidly changing.”34  The process also illustrates 
how the Republican leadership privileged unification behind one proposal.  It must not be 
forgotten that the party was in the minority in Congress, and it had been for some time.  
Republicans were slowly rallying behind the crafting of a clear and radical electoral message 
to win back influence in Washington, D.C.  And most believed that they were “doing the 
bidding of the American people,” who supported in large majorities such measures as 
enforcing work and ending entitlement.35  There was a growing belief that unified and radical 
action on welfare, even if not written into law, would improve Republican support across the 
country.  The rub is that the most conservative members simply wanted a “brawl,” while more 
moderate Republicans believed there was an opportunity, even while the party was in the 
minority, to write law, not a political manifesto.36  Most of these lawmakers had some 
experience with the idea or process of “welfare reform.”  Before 1996 brought about 
comprehensive reform, the notion of “welfare reform” was regarded as a ‘politics of 
proposition’:  there was more to be gained by both parties in proposing slight fixes that dealt 
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with one aspect of welfare’s problems than “carrying through with the unglamorous task” of 
actually restructuring welfare programs.37 
By the Fall of 1993, the aspirations of Shaw and Santorum to create a bill that could 
unify the party were vindicated.  The work group’s bill prevailed against Meyers’ stand-alone 
and more conservative legislation in a vote of the Republican Conference.  By November 10, 
1993, 160 of the 176 Republicans in the House, joined by the entirety of the Republican 
leadership, agreed to co-sponsor what became HR 3500.38  In a letter to the National 
Republican Congressional Committee, Santorum explained that the bill defined welfare reform 
as “more work, less spending, more flexibility for states, and no welfare for aliens,” which he 
believed would not only generate support among lawmakers in both the House and the Senate, 
but also could arouse the sympathies of the American people.39  However, HR 3500 enjoyed 
brief support before undergoing the disarray of a “family feud” over the upcoming election 
and welfare reform’s significance in it. 
The backlash theory understands the passage of PRWORA through the conservative 
currents that engulfed legislators in the 1993-96 period.  Welfare became unpopular over time, 
according to Mead, because it was increasingly associated with bad behaviors that the 
American public did not support.40  While most voters believed that there should be 
government programs to assist the poor, they also believed that low-income individuals should 
“help themselves,” mainly through work.41  As early as the 1930s, polls have shown that 
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Americans are committed to public assistance as well as a demand of work.42  While growth 
in welfare caseloads concerned many, especially law-makers who have been responsible for 
funding, “The American people are much less concerned with getting people off welfare and 
reducing the costs of the system than they are with having recipients make an effort to help 
themselves.”43  This position both supports and undermines the backlash account.  On one 
view, the public was expressing its hostility to the “permissiveness of traditional welfare,” and 
therefore supporting a backlash of a narrower kind: namely, against a welfare system that 
promoted dependence.44  On another view, the American people were not engaged in the kind 
of backlash that lawmakers took them to support, and that is one in which the goal was to cap 
spending on welfare programs and dramatically reduce the scale of government.  What is clear 
is that the backlash account is pinned to the notion that public opinion explains the shift on 
welfare, from an entitlement that dispersed cash to temporary assistance conditioned on work.  
But, politicians’ interpretation may have been different from what the public wanted, which 
might also be different from what is best for low-income families.  To the extent that what the 
public wanted held explanatory force, Mead has argued that the public wanted reform to 
emulate the Wisconsin Works program (W-2), which combined a work-orientation with lavish, 
temporary benefits.45 (Chapter III examines this notion more closely, as well as the influence 
of W-2 on informing federal policy.) 
Also, since the 1960s, welfare has undergone a change in expectations.  Whereas 
Americans in large part believed that mothers should stay home with their children before the 
																																																						
42 Michael E. Schlitz (1970), Public Attitudes Toward Social Security, 1935-1965, Research Report 33 (U.S. 
Government Printing Office). 
43 R. Kent Weaver (2000), Ending Welfare as We Know It (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), p. 
186. 
44 Mead “The Politics of Conservative Welfare Reform,” p. 206. 
45 Ibid., p. 208. 
		 31 
1960s, generational transformation in such expectations led the majority of Americans to 
believe that mothers receiving welfare should work, as most other mothers were then 
working.46  During this time, Americans continued to affirm the importance of marriage and 
two-parent family formation, but more and more Americans were less disapproving of unwed 
sexual activity, divorce, and single parenthood.  This reality lay uncomfortably in the backdrop 
of the more conservative reforms of Meyers’ bill in 1993, for example.  The public, broadly 
speaking, was less committed to these values, whereas the public was prepared to see work as 
a condition of aid.47  
These public opinion trends are important in the backlash account, which sees the 
public’s beliefs as ideological energy in the manifestation of welfare reform.48  For more 
conservative Republicans, the American people were most concerned about the moral state of 
the country, especially over the incidence of divorce and unwed teen pregnancy.49  Therefore, 
they led the attack on HR 3500, which they regarded as “pusillanimous.”50  William Bennett, 
Jack Kemp, and Vin Weber, acting through the Empower America group, argued that HR 3500 
“[would] squander a defining moment in our national life”51  These Republicans believed that 
the party should present a welfare reform proposal that more seriously addressed out-of-
wedlock births, reigned in hidden costs that states were expected to fund, and demanded a 
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stronger work requirement.52  The Empower America group was more influenced by Charles 
Murray’s research, but many Republicans worried whether or not his proposals would be 
palatable to voters.53  Additionally, Senate Republicans, who were to the left of House 
Republicans on most issues, were not expected to support “Murray Light” legislation.54 
Nevertheless, conservative Republicans in the House were confident that the public 
demanded their reforms, or at least that it would benefit the party in the upcoming midterm 
election.  On April 28, 1994, a group of conservative congressmen, including Bennett, 
introduced a bill that they called the “Real Welfare Reform Bill,” which included stronger 
provisions on welfare spending and work requirements, and which also stripped cash welfare 
and Food Stamps from unmarried women under the age of twenty-one with children.55  After 
this event, Minority Leader Newt Gingrich and his aides became much more involved in 
reconciling the conservative Republican forces with the more moderate measures of HR 3500, 
in order to present an appealing and united electoral message.  Welfare reform, along the lines 
of the Santorum and Shaw bill, became one of the ten central pillars of the “Contract with 
America.”  But, significant changes were made to mollify conservative groups.  For example, 
HR 3500’s state options to adopt the Murray Light proposal and the family cap were converted 
into requirements – no federal AFDC funds were permitted to be used to benefit mothers under 
the age of eighteen.56  Despite modifications like this, the crafting of the welfare reform bill of 
the Contract with America reflected the significant movement to the right among the 
legislators, as Haskins documented.  At the end of the day, the Republicans had legislation 
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behind which they could unite; President Clinton and House Democrats did not.  His task 
force’s proposal came too late to be marked-up in time for the November 1994 election, also a 
reason why the leadership let it die in committee.57  
So far, these developments have been prior to the Republican’s sweeping victory in 
November of 1994, two years before PRWORA was passed.  But, this is how the backlash 
account understands welfare reform, as rooted in the accomplishment of achieving Republican 
majorities in the House and Senate.  It permitted the opportunity for the Republican version of 
welfare reform, as represented by the modified Contract with America HR 3500, to be enacted 
into law.  The claiming of Congress, in this account, relieved the pressures on Republican 
lawmakers to position themselves sufficiently to the left in order to attract the president’s 
signature.  The onus would now be on the Clinton Administration to sign Republican welfare 
reform.  In perhaps the strongest affirmation of the backlash theory, due to the stunning 1994 
victory and the Republican majority dominance, “the center of gravity for all other participants 
now shifted decisively to the right in the ongoing bargaining among House, Senate, and Clinton 
Administration policymakers.”58  This rightward shift vindicates the central notion of 
conservative backlash. 
Despite this, there were two years of developments between the conservative 
realignment that occurred in the 1994 midterm election and the passage of PRWORA in 
August of 1996.  In that time, Senator Bob Dole brokered a compromise that Clinton backed, 
which dropped the unpopular “illegitimacy provisions” among moderates down to state options 
again.59  Yet, efforts by the more conservative forces in Congress remained diligent.  Speaker 
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Gingrich took the electoral results as a vindication not only of the Contract with America and 
its ten bills, but also as a mandate for the anti-government ethos of the document.60  This belief 
became a vision of “replacing the welfare state,” or at least fundamentally redefining it, which 
brought the government into an unpopular shutdown that proved devastating for both parties.61  
HR 3500 was transformed into a larger effort to block-grant Medicaid and alter the Food 
Stamps program.  Twice Clinton vetoed the conservative leadership’s efforts to reform welfare.  
By the end, they were forced to retreat back to a less partisan proposal, the effort of which was 
led by Senator Trent Lott, after Bob Dole departed to run against Clinton in the upcoming 
presidential election.  Despite the protestations of the Dole campaign,62 passage of PRWORA 
can be seen partly as the result of a “convergence of electoral interest,” as Heclo notes.63  
Backchannel communications between Lott and Clinton led to an implicit “reelection 
compact,” as Clinton needed to deliver on his previous promise to “end welfare as we know 
it,” and Republicans needed to hold the Congress.64  The bill was signed, after accommodations 
were made on childcare spending as well as a larger contingency fund, and “illegitimacy” 
provisions were made optional, as in the Dole compromise.65  While Clinton objected to some 
measures, in particular the stripping of benefits from noncitizens, the president and his advisers 
considered that once popular measures of reform, such as work requirements and time limits, 
were in place, the public would be more willing to support other benefits for recipients, 
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especially those living within inner-cities.66  Ultimately, Clinton signed PROWRA because he 
judged the bill sufficiently close to his proposal, with the option to resurrect some measures in 
the future.67 
The problem with the backlash account is not in that it is false.  The foregoing 
establishes how intuitive the theory is as well as the dimensions that are well captured by 
Republicans winning a stunning electoral victory, with a completed bill in store.  The fault of 
the account lies in that it makes an explanatory claim about a phenomenon that is at its core a 
complex and elite process.  Mead notes that public opinion had been, more or less, constant 
over the years about enforcing work, and since the 1960s, entitlement had been less attractive 
to a growing number of Americans.  So, why did PRWORA come to pass in 1996?  Backlash 
is informed by a belief in a rightward electoral shift, from the public to the legislators.  But, 
the energy of reform had less to do with the scale of government, and more to do with changing 
the nature of welfare.68  Mead claims that this is what the public really wanted, i.e., recasting 
the contours of the program as well as its objective, and this is also where elites ultimately 
converged.  As Chapter III will show, social science evidence emanating from the states, in a 
sense, pushed everyone to the right on welfare reform.  But, this still understands reform in the 
left-right space.  What was really involved was getting reform correct and solving dependency 
and poverty as if they were rather simple problems entailing a tinkered solution.  
*        *       * 
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“Negotiating Welfare Reform:  A Conventional Narrative Re-Visited” 
Chapter III: “Dissensus Politics” Overcome? 
 
The previous chapter discussed the conventional narrative that welfare reform can be seen as 
a conservative backlash, and it suggested that the account needs, at minimum, to be 
supplemented by a theory of the more complex dimensions of welfare policy formation.  This 
chapter advances this effort by presenting one influential theory for the failure of 
comprehensive reform, as resulting from irreconcilable elite conflict.  Steven Teles, an 
influential political scientist who held this position before PRWORA was signed into law, 
argued that “If substantial change in AFDC does occur, it will be largely the result of a shift in 
the orientation of a portion of the nation’s intellectuals.”1  Naturally, this chapter will seek to 
modify this account of welfare reform failure by suggesting that Teles’ “Dissensus Politics” 
was overcome in the formation of PRWORA. 
In order to argue this position, this chapter will spell out what was meant by 
“dissensus,” how it relates to welfare reform, and what role policy and social science research 
played in the story. Crucially, the chapter will close in on the importance of “political learning” 
that emanated from the states, Wisconsin in particular.  As has been noted elsewhere,2 
Wisconsin remains especially influential due to (1) the fact that state-level reform occurred 
over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s, before comprehensive reform garnered 
sufficient strength in the Congress; (2) evaluation of reforms, such as mandatory work 
requirements, had enough time to enter into the legislative, academic, and policy literatures 
before formation of PRWORA; and, (3) the bipartisan efforts of the Democratic legislature 
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and Republican governorship demonstrated what “good government” legislation could look 
like on a national stage.  This chapter seeks to illuminate with greater clarity the conflict 
occurring among the nations’ elites, and it intends on drawing out the importance of research 
and new evidence in bolstering a consensual elite-level opinion structure that departed from 
the previous irreconcilable conflict.  Ultimately, it was political energy combined with this new 
framework that permitted AFDC to radically morph into TANF.   
 
DISSENSUS POLITICS 
Teles uses the term “dissensus” to characterize the nature of the welfare program, at this point: 
AFDC.  And by this, he means that almost every aspect of AFDC was controversial, at least 
from the 1960s onwards – its standards of eligibility, federal structure, benefit levels, and 
recipient obligations.  Whereas other programs of the American welfare state, such as the 
Social Security program, enjoyed wider support and were created according to a “consensual 
opinion structure,” contemporary AFDC politics did not occur at the margins.3  Rather, the 
very idea of the program itself was unpopular – and yet, resistant to alteration.  Dissensus 
politics helps account for why. 
Traditionally, policy change occurs when public consensus matches elite consensus.  
Teles notes that comprehensive change is the result of such an alignment, when it is 
“sufficiently strong, persistent, and mature” to offset interest group pressures.4   And, as 
Lawrence Jacobs has argued, “public opinion is most influential in directing policy 
deliberations when it is unambiguous and strong.”5  Welfare, then – as we can surmise from 
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the public opinion information this thesis has already examined6 – is an anomaly.  Why could 
the public consensus about welfare policy failure recur so strongly, for so long, while elite 
opinion remained divided?   
At first pass, one answer might simply be that the public was “wrong” about welfare’s 
failures (after all, polls have suggested, for example, that the public is committed to increased 
assistance for low-income families and blacks, in particular, but is against the concept of 
welfare, or “living off the government”).7  The wishes of the public are not always known for 
their clarity, nor consistency.  However, in such a case that a dimension of public opinion is 
wrongly founded, Teles argues that this precisely is the job of intellectual elites to reconcile – 
how to translate public beliefs and values into policy accomplishments, or otherwise to educate 
public opinion on its misconceptions.8  This translation did not occur for welfare until 1996 by 
virtue of PRWORA. 
Partly, this is because AFDC is a special case, and welfare is particularly susceptible 
to cultural and intellectual politics.9  The answers to the types of questions on which the 
program is predicated are inherently moral and reflect a cultural comprehension of societal 
commitment – “What is the value of work?” or  “What are one’s obligations to others in an 
orderly society?”10  This thesis makes use of the cultural theory of Michael Thompson, Richard 
Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, who formulated a helpful schema to understand and analyze 
political culture.11  Three of their groups will help to ground the elite-level orientations that 
have contributed to the dissensus politics of welfare reform. 
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First, there are the hierarchists, whose values include order, tradition, and structure.  
Hierarchists place grave importance on the family, the local community, and one’s religious 
(or moral-informing) institutions.  While some elites find themselves among this group, 
reflecting its cultural orientation, the most important hierarchist elites that have affected the 
welfare debate are: conservative religious leaders.  Second, there are the individualists, whose 
principal values are liberty and self-determination.  Thompson et al. see the chief social 
institution for an individualist to be the market, and the role of the state is to uphold and defend 
it.  Consequently, business leaders, economists, and libertarians are the most important elites 
associated with this orientation.  Third, there are the egalitarians, who value the protection of 
minority groups and equality (adequacy) of social provision.  The main institution for 
egalitarians is the “polity,” by which I interpret this to mean the various branches of the federal 
government.  Egalitarians, thus, are engaged in an effort to redistribute the privileges of 
position from those who possess such power, to those who do not.  The media, academics, and 
attorneys (or other professionals) are most associated with this position.12 
Because of the conflict that naturally arises from these group orientations, matters of 
reform for welfare have been made particularly more complex.  This is because, especially 
recently, reform efforts reflect a “proxy” battle that is implicitly predicated upon a cultural 
foundation.  Welfare reform is thus a “politics of morality,” which strains the chances of 
“compromise and reconciliation.”13  While the public has reflected a consensus on the values 
of any cash-aid welfare program, elites have remained divided because their cultural cleavages 
are starker and amplified in the policy formation process. 
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One problem, that deserves mention again, has already been referenced:  welfare 
recipients are notoriously poorly organized.14  This has had the effect of transferred 
representation to the very elites who operate according to their own biases and ideologies, first 
and foremost.  For example, the Children’s Defense Fund is not committed per se to fighting 
poverty and influencing a transition from welfare to work for low-income recipients – rather, 
the organization advocates on behalf of children and their material well-being.  A paternalistic 
reform from a hierarchist orientation, for example, which might reduce aid if a recipient’s 
child does not attend school, would be thoroughly opposed (the Learnfare program of 
Wisconsin is one such case, and it was especially controversial to Democrats because it not 
only reduced the benefits of recipient families extensively, but it was predicated upon a 
contested moralizing orientation).15  As Teles succinctly put it, “The interests at issue in 
welfare policy-making are only tangentially those of recipients themselves.”16 
So, our focus should then be on understanding elite opinion, and how it has shifted with 
time, as we already know that public opinion has only become stronger and more consistent 
on welfare reform.  Unfortunately, as James Q. Wilson has quipped, “Our shelves are filled 
with books on public opinion but not with ones on elite opinion.”17  Nonetheless, some 
reflections are fairly straightforward and self-evident.   
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First, who are the elites?  For the purposes of this thesis, “the elites” are contrasted 
from the public, which connotes “everyone,” in the important respect that they are the leaders 
and the intellectuals.  This is meant in the strict sense, i.e., that the elites are the men and 
women “of letters,” who have obtained higher education degrees, and who read and write 
about, and analyze, such important topics as anti-poverty policy.  And, the elites are “leaders” 
in the sense that they are active participants in policy formation.  To be sure, the elites include 
social workers, religious leaders, and elected representatives – but the elites also include 
resident scholars of think tanks, university associate professors, and foundation executives as 
well as curators of funded research.  The elites are those who comment on and influence policy, 
not those who are passive recipients of that policy, or observers of the effects of such policy, 
understood through the media outlets. 
With this in mind, a few important reflections characterize the ways in which elites 
operate.  First, elites are highly ideological.  What sets these individuals apart from the public 
is that they have “well-constrained ideological structures that rank-order political values and 
ensure that positions on various issues will cohere.”18  In the American context, highly 
ideological thinking means emphasizing one aspect of the multiple dimensions of the 
American experience over and against the others, which is “culturally disintegrative.”19  Teles 
argues that this is the opposite of what the public does, as it is largely culturally integrative – 
and that this forms the content of the conflict between elites and the public, the basis of the 
politics of dissensus.20  However, this does not seem to hit the mark as it relates to welfare.  At 
one level, American elites may be ideological, but also they tend to be in agreement on most 
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topics.  Whether one is a Washington “insider” or an “East Coast Ivy League” intellectual or a 
union labor leader or even a Protestant pastor, the elite experience is characterized by formality, 
empiricism, and a degree of cosmopolitan openness (or at least, awareness).  Welfare elites are 
divided much more narrowly, mainly on collectivist-liberalist grounds, as Robert Lerner et al. 
have found in their surveys of elite opinion.21  And, they are likely to be equally apportioned 
between the left and the right.22   
Division along the lines of collectivist-liberalism connotes a division over social 
obligation and recipient expectation, especially for those programs that promise certain 
benefits and privileges.  In this respect, elites are engaged in the politics of dissensus, where 
one pole emphasizes “individual attributions of blame” for poverty, and the other pole focuses 
on “system” attribution or social-institutional factors.23  An example of a practitioner of the 
latter is the more “progressive” intellectual, William Julius Wilson, who has argued that 
poverty among black families can be attributed to social considerations arising from racism 
and ghettoization as well as (crucially) the decline in the number of well-paying manufacturing 
jobs – both of which are at the root of such problems as drug use and crime, for him.24  
Hierarchist thinkers, such as Lawrence Mead, agree on some of the considerations regarding 
the “culture of poverty” and its corrosive effects, but their answer tends to be more 
paternalistic, which involves greater demands on recipient expectation (or obligation), as 
opposed to the egalitarian position of emphasizing alleviation of need.25  Individualists, like 
Charles Murray or (earlier) Milton Friedman, have responded to the poverty of low-income 
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families by attempting to alter their decision frameworks according to a rational-choice 
perspective – by incentivizing “good behavior” and removing the incentives that encourage 
dependency, they believe that welfare recipients will be better off.  In effect, the battle is 
between “traditional and insurgent elites,” who share a number of positions, but come from 
often conflicting cultural and moral standpoints.26  This dissensus had frustrated 
comprehensive reform until, as I will suggest, something changed.  In addition to the 
significant electoral factor, these elites converged on the content of reform, despite their 
divergent intellectual orientations.   
 
ELITE CONFLICT AND POLICY 
Before this point can be borne out, the dissensual conflict must be given greater structure.  In 
what ways, specifically, did these divergent elites influence welfare reform?  To begin, this 
thesis views the array of elites as able to divide neatly between intellectual and advocacy 
camps.  Intellectual elites, such as Murray and Wilson, spent more of their time researching 
and writing than actively advocating for a particular constituency or engaging with law-makers 
on a routine basis.  Nevertheless, they found themselves spending more of their time in 
Washington, D.C.  Intellectual elites, again broadly speaking, cloister themselves within the 
universities as well as think tanks and foundations.  The Harvard professors David Ellwood 
and Mary Jo Bane have already been referenced.  Both came from center-left backgrounds and 
had spent, before joining the Clinton Administration, most of their time writing within the 
confines of the Yard.  For welfare reform, most of the positions to the left emanated from 
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university campuses.  Partly, this is a reason for the increasing significance of foundations and 
think tanks, which had taken larger research and advocacy roles by the mid- to late-1970s.27 
Elite cultural conflict led to the politicization of foundations.  Whereas foundations had 
been motivated by philanthropic instincts, by the early 1990s, most of the major ones were 
engaged in focused advocacy of a “discernable ideological tendency.”28  On the right, we have 
seen the Olin, Smith Richardson, and Bradley foundations; on the left, the Ford, Carnegie, and 
Rockefeller foundations.  Althea Nagai et al. report that almost 95 percent of the support given 
by these foundations goes to support researchers who champion their particular ideology.29 
The think tank world seems to have risen in importance as a result of the increasing 
concentration of left-leaning thinkers in academia.  The perception of leftist hegemony in the 
“world of ideas” has been particularly influential in the formation of a counterestablishment.30  
Among think tanks, only the Brookings Institution and (to some degree) the Urban Institute 
can be said to be culturally integrative; the other hundreds of think tanks refract a committed 
ideology, either on the left or the right.  Such think tanks include, for the former, the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities or the Institute for Policy Studies; on the right, such think tanks 
include the Cato, Hoover, and American Enterprise Institutes (in the individualist tradition), 
the Heritage Foundation and Christian Coalition (among the hierarchist orientation).31 
The intellectual elites have found themselves most influential from their camps in 
academia, foundations, and think tanks (if not in government) – this is where they have staged 
their efforts to translate their opinions into policy formation.  Advocacy elites are only 
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exempted here because the following chapter grants them more focused consideration, 
especially with respect to their appearance before the congressional committees responsible 
for drafting welfare reform.  Next, this chapter turns to the role such intellectual elite research 
played in PRWORA.  And, it examines how the divergent perspectives, which conducted 
research emphasizing different factors, ultimately arrived at similar conclusions about the 
content of reform.  
 
THE ROLE OF RESEARCH 
As Diana Zuckerman pointed out, the research that informed the passage of PRWORA 
did not originate in the offices of the Congressional Research Service, nor the Government 
Accountability Office – instead, the research that swayed law-makers emanated from state 
demonstrations, which intellectual elites refracted upward and outward.32  Evaluative evidence, 
which occurred due to waivers granted to states by the Department of Health and Human 
Services, turned out to be a boon for those legislators who were committed to more radical 
reform.  Until the early- to mid-1990s, the welfare reform modus operandi was incrementalism, 
or “tireless tinkering.”  Efforts to fundamentally alter the structure of AFDC, along the lines 
of what public opinion was demanding, seemed impossible to do.  The FSA of 1988 reflected 
this perspective, as it achieved reform through compromise and political prudence.  
While this fact is often cited as a reason for the legislation’s failure, the FSA proved to 
be hugely important to comprehensive reform through PRWORA.  It set a “new consensus,” 
albeit weakly, on the direction of reform.33  I will return to the significance of the waivers or 
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demonstration projects that it authorized, as the start of this section notes:  they were important 
for the shape and contour of the research that informed PRWORA.  But first, the ‘new 
consensus’ deserves attention.  The FSA took the previous decade of experience as a guide for 
incremental changes, the most important of which I would suggest are:  (1) the fact that work 
would be an obligation, (2) parents should be held responsible for raising the children they 
conceived, and (3) “tagging,” or the flexible and differential provision of services contingent 
upon circumstance, would be appropriate.34  (Notice that this consensus does not include 
alteration of welfare’s entitlement status.)  Each of these was weakly enforced, to some, but 
what the FSA did was expand experimental demonstration and require evaluation, with the 
intention of producing a rich repertoire of evidence for research.35 
Thus, later findings were able to bring to attention such major social concerns as 
insincere child support enforcement, to intellectual elites across the political spectrum.  For 
instance, PRWORA noted that “only 54 percent of single-parent families with children had a 
child support order established and, of that 54 percent, only about one-half received the full 
amount due.”36  This was something that unnerved both Republicans and Democrats, which 
helped to fuel convergence – but such a process could only have arisen if each of the parties’ 
intellectual engineers had completed the same research and communicated their kindred 
conclusions.  And so, despite the fact that the legislation ultimately was written by Republican 
staffers, these sorts of findings reflect the substantial movement among the actors of policy 
formation toward conquering the politics of dissensus.  Also, take for example the politically 
charged assertion of increasing “illegitimacy” throughout the country, and especially among 
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welfare recipients.  While the elites continued to disagree about the harshness of “Murray 
Light,” or terminating cash aid to unwed teenage mothers, the intellectual elites and law-
makers started to agree upon the seriousness of the consequences of teenage motherhood as 
well as single motherhood.  And, a position that did not address the issue became weakly 
enforceable, if not also a political liability to dissenting law-makers.  Such development, I 
suggest, is indicative of convergence, especially when a few years prior these elites could not 
even agree on the aims of reform.37 
Another consequence of FSA and the research it brought about was data that could be 
evaluated and interpreted in different ways. This undermined the “you have your research; we 
have ours” mentality in a constructive way.  Research that could “cut both ways,” so to speak, 
permitted scholars to take different positions given their values.  Take the results of a study 
conducted by a left-leaning nonprofit organization for example.  The researchers concluded 
that mothers receiving welfare were not “lazy, dependent, or passive” because 4 out of 10 
recipients were able to work in paid jobs during a 2 year period on welfare.38  Of course, this 
meant that 6 out of 10 were not able to do so.  And, undoubtedly, this fact is what right-leaning 
elites emphasized.  However, such findings were able to demonstrate to right-leaning elites 
that progress was being made for recipients of welfare.  For left-leaning elites, such findings 
enabled political repositioning – the stronger interpretation could push these scholars 
rightward, or at least to undermine their own belief in the strength of their position.  Indeed, 
by the time that comprehensive welfare reform picked up speed in 1994, nobody was prepared 
to defend AFDC and the status quo; everyone agreed that it was failure, just to differing extents.  
																																																						
37 Zuckerman, “Welfare Reform in America,” p. 594. 
38 R. M. Spalter-Roth, H. L. Hartmann, & L. Andrews (1992), Combining Work and Welfare: An Alternative Anti-
Poverty Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Women’s Policy Research); see: Zuckerman, “Welfare 
Reform in America,” p. 593. 
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Greater evidence suggesting failure, as well as positive assessments of demonstration projects, 
led to the gradual erosion of the elite conflict.  Cultural orientations gave way to political 
learning. 
 
EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES 
As suggested above, evidence emanating from the states proved influential in eroding 
dissensus politics.  Because state governments tend to be more responsive to the demands of 
their own constituencies – (the same individuals who had been expressing their dissatisfaction 
with AFDC) – efforts had been taken throughout the country to try and fix welfare dependency.  
This occurred due to the greater discretion that DHHS waivers provided, which was an effect 
of the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.39  This legislation, 
championed by the Reagan Administration, was passed in an effort to increase the latitude 
extended to state governments to improve their AFDC programs.  The Administration hoped 
that states would introduce “workfare” programs in which recipients would work in public 
service jobs in exchange for benefits.40  Yet, as Wiseman has noted, “These state initiatives 
featured an extraordinary collection and combination of interventions, ranging from benefit 
reductions to cash incentive schemes, for encouraging inoculation of children against 
disease.”41 By 1992, due to passage of OBRA, states had initiated 24 demonstration projects, 
which increased even further under the Clinton Administration.42 
Not surprisingly, this provided a rich opportunity for intellectual elites to evaluate the 
effects of these reform-oriented demonstrations, many of which implemented programs of 
																																																						
39 Wiseman, “Welfare Reform in the United States,” p. 613. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 618. 
42 Ibid. 
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work incentives or requirements in exchange for benefits.  While many elites evaluated the 
states’ projects, the most influential for comprehensive reform was the evaluation conducted 
by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.  Funded by the Ford Foundation, 
considered at the pinnacle of dispassionate and quantitative research assessment, the MDRC 
approached many states to evaluate their ‘welfare-to-work’ projects and to publish findings for 
legislators in Washington to consider.  On the aggregate, by 1987, the MDRC had concluded 
that workfare and work-orientated programs had statistically significant effects on the 
probability that recipients found jobs.43  It also reported that its findings were robust across 
many environments and in various contexts, that at least some of the programs were cost 
effective, and that the recipients themselves reported a positive view of such demonstrations.44  
The MDRC continued to publish findings that only refined and helped to clarify the effects of 
state reforms, especially work programs, but its initial round of evaluations in the 1980s had 
done enough to convince intellectual elites of welfare’s needed work focus.    
These findings further fueled governors to request waivers from the Reagan and then 
George Bush, Sr. Administrations, as the waivers were politically powerful, especially given 
their positive effects.  As has been documented, the story of welfare waivers is one of rapid 
and systematic diffusion across the states.45  While OBRA was a catalyst for state flexibility 
and innovative program development, the FSA of 1988 specifically authorized waivers for 
work programs, and structured incentives for the development of such programs.  Even the 
Clinton administration encouraged and approved each waiver application it received.  In fact, 
Zylan and Soule note that Clinton instructed the DHHS to solicit waivers as a method to act 
																																																						
43 Ibid., pp. 614-15. 
44 Ibid., p. 615. 
45 Yvonne Zylan and Sarah A. Soule (Dec. 2000), “Ending Welfare as We Know It (Again): Welfare State 
Retrenchment, 1989-1995,” Social Forces Vol. 79, No. 2, p. 627. 
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on welfare without having to address the serious policy complexities in reforming welfare 
through the Congress.46  In practice, welfare waivers were never outright rejected, they were 
always negotiated carefully between the state and the administration.  Teles argues that the 
granting of waivers, especially by the Clinton Administration, was actually a practice that 
accentuated the politics of dissensus, or at least was a consequence of it; waiver-granting was 
an exercise in “conflict avoidance” by permitting the continuance (and incremental 
improvement) of the AFDC program.47  While this may have obtained, the granting of waivers 
by the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations had the important effect of leading to 
AFDC’s own undoing.  Instead of “obviat[ing] the need for legislative welfare reform,” as 
Howard Dean of Vermont (the former Chairman of the National Governor’s Association) 
argued, waivers had generated results that undermined the AFDC status quo.48  This point is 
borne out in the old reflection that the states are the ‘laboratories of democracy.’  Rapid 
diffusion of work-orientated welfare demonstration projects necessitated sober and scientific 
evaluation, such as that provided by the MDRC; much was learned from states that availed 
themselves of such freedoms, such as Ohio, Michigan, New Jersey, California, and 
Wisconsin.49 By the time of PRWORA, it was clear that state “[p]olicy innovation was 
informed by, and then informed, federal policy and practice.”50  
Wisconsin. The exemplar for a state being informed by, and then informing, federal 
policy is Wisconsin.  This is because the state government acted early and robustly in 
addressing welfare’s problems, especially its increasing caseload and burden on state finances.  
																																																						
46 Ibid., p. 629. 
47 Teles, Whose Welfare?, pp. 159-61. 
48 See: Ibid., p. 162. 
49 Donald F. Norris and Lyke Thompson (1995), “Findings and Lessons from the Politics of Welfare Reform,” in 
The Politics of Welfare Reform, Donald F. Norris and Lyke Thompson, eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage), pp. 
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Starting in 1986, Wisconsin began decreasing its caseload, a trajectory that continued almost 
without interruption through 1996.  But, focusing on decreasing the caseload of AFDC in the 
state and relieving dependency belies the stronger feat of the degree to which the welfare 
bureaucracy required work among recipients.  One of the first waivers that Republican 
Governor Tommy Thompson obtained permitted the state to change the rules that had 
exempted mothers with children under the age of six from working in exchange for their 
welfare benefits; Thompson set the age at two in 1988, and one in 1995.  This effort – along 
with so many other efforts – permitted the state to achieve a JOBS program participation rate 
of 60.6 percent in 1996, up from 38.8 percent in 1991.51  Still, perhaps the most reflective and 
important measure of the success of the state’s reform is the effects on former recipients.  By 
the mid 1990s, almost three-fifths of welfare leavers were working and their poverty rates were 
decreasing.52  And, a 2000 measure ranks Wisconsin second in the nation for the percentage 
of welfare leavers satisfied with the work standard of (albeit the later passed and implemented) 
TANF.53   
Wisconsin is mentioned here not to reveal the particulars of its own politics of welfare 
reform or the implementation of its various work programs, but rather to stress the fact that it 
influenced federal legislation tremendously.  Since the year 1987 when Governor Thompson 
took office through January of 1994, Wisconsin initiated nine welfare reform demonstrations.  
One of which, Work Not Welfare, captured national attention and an “army of researchers.”  
Work Not Welfare was introduced, rather late from the perspective of PRWORA, in 1995 to 
test time-limited aid in two small counties in Wisconsin.  Given Thompson’s past record and 
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52 Ibid., pp. 4-6.  
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his impressive caseload decline achievement, the fact that the Clinton administration 
authorized this waiver request following Clinton’s address to the National Governor’s 
Association, helped to influence elite re-imagination of welfare’s fundamental design.54  
However, it was the JOBS program, which was authorized under the FSA, that really had 
fueled the convergence on comprehensive reform’s work orientation.  Wisconsin’s record in 
this regard – of moving “poor families not only off welfare but into jobs” – captured the 
attentions of moderate Republicans and Democrats, who wanted to radically restructure 
welfare without ending it completely or simply ‘throwing more money at it.’55  
In this regard, Wisconsin is important, especially if the Mead thesis is taken seriously.  
On his reading, Wisconsin not only provided the research evidence that work programs work, 
so to speak.  But, Wisconsin also demonstrated that “good government” was at the crux of 
welfare policy success.  This is to say that part of the success Wisconsin had in reforming 
welfare stems from the fact that its government “governs well,” and does not simply do “new 
things”; it makes effective policies and implements them.56  Mead links this “good 
government” tendency to Wisconsin’s moralistic political culture, under the influence of 
Daniel Elazar’s scheme.57  Our objective here entails no consideration of this dimension of 
Mead’s conclusion; rather, it is the elite characteristics that are of value in our consideration of 
the elite convergence that occurred in passage of PRWORA.  Mead finds that Wisconsin 
displayed a high degree of political prudence in its approach to welfare reform, and both 
Republicans and Democrats sought to address welfare dependency and, relatedly, systemic 
poverty as problems that beg for solutions.  This orientation is further displayed by Wisconsin’s 
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professional legislature and bureaucracy, which paid higher salaries than those of other states 
and which “innately” displayed a capacity to tackle welfare’s problems with “vigor.”58  
Certainly, Thompson’s local initiatives – Self Sufficiency First and Pay for Performance – 
helped to develop these endogenous variables (they created financial incentives for agency 
personnel to move welfare recipients from the rolls and into jobs).59  But, Mead is keen on 
pointing out that Wisconsin is unlike New York or Florida or Mississippi, for instance.  He is 
clear that this is not just according to the variables of benefit level or obligations for service – 
Wisconsin’s secret is in that it transcended the poles of party to fundamentally re-evaluate the 
meaning of welfare and the objectives it would pursue.  Chiefly, it did so by raising work levels 
as a goal in itself, as opposed to simply giving more or less funds to low-income families.60  
But, it also did this with extreme generosity.  Wisconsin not only wanted to require, as oppose 
to merely incentivize, work; it believed in giving welfare recipients the tools needed to 
succeed.  In its case, this meant plentiful child assistance funding and other support services.61  
This reflects the union of perspectives, between Republicans and Democrats in the state, on 
reducing poverty inasmuch as decreasing the state’s welfare caseload. 
No wonder Wisconsin attracted national attention, “[a]nd from publicity […] 
influence.”62  It was a waiver leader that had demonstrated what radical reform of welfare 
could look like, while accomplishing many of the goals of both parties.  This further frustrated 
continuity of the status quo under AFDC.  By late 1995, when Governor Thompson announced 
the Wisconsin Works (W-2) waiver, which instituted close to a full work requirement among 
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recipients of cash aid and which supplied “affordable” child and health care, traditional 
Democrat objections that reform along the lines of a block grant (what PRWORA ultimately 
achieved) would lead to a ‘race to the bottom,’ dissipated.  W-2 repudiated this concern, and I 
suggest fueled additional convergence along the lines of the the weak FSA consensus.63 
 
CONCLUSION:  DISSENSUS OVERCOME?   
Much of what has been said at this juncture seems to suggest that dissensus among the 
intellectual elites was overcome, most notably due to the natural experiment that occurred 
within the various states.  “Between January 1987 and August 1996, 46 states had received 
approval for waivers to experiment with AFDC and welfare-to-work programs,” and this 
undoubtedly convinced legislators that a work focus was required in federal welfare reform.64  
But, it was the effects of these waivers and demonstration projects that moved the nation’s 
elites to converge on the content of reform.  As has been described, work requirements in 
Wisconsin led to increased self-sufficiency, falling poverty rates, and positive self evaluations 
among former cash-aid recipients.65  These effects mattered for the elites.  Intellectuals such 
as Charles Murray, William Julius Wilson, David Ellwood, and Mickey Kaus all were 
proposing alterations or even alternatives to AFDC in their research in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and most of them agreed that entitlement cash-aid did little good for the country’s 
poorest members.66   
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The “intellectual renaissance” of the elites, sparked by experiments in the states and 
political repositioning among the Democrats through the Progressive Policy Institute and the 
Democratic Leadership Council, permitted liberals in particular to move away from cash-aid 
and to embrace “a work- and family-oriented philosophy of welfare.”67  On the right, the same 
hoary maxim of “move to the center” obtained as well.  One example is the American 
Enterprise Institute’s The New Consensus on Family and Welfare, which advised lawmakers 
to pass welfare reform along the lines of the Wisconsin example, thereby reflecting what Teles 
deems as a “culturally integrative worldview.”68  For instance, it held the position that “no 
person should be involuntarily poor without having assistance from others” and “[n]o able 
adult should be allowed voluntarily to take from the common good without also contributing 
to it.”69  These positions were all the more crystalized by the time comprehensive welfare 
reform had a shot of passage in the summer of 1996.  While it is true that the “illegitimacy” 
issue came from right-field, almost upending the chances of PRWORA’s passage, the 
commitment to work and adequate assistance was fairly clear among the mainstream members 
of both the Republican and Democratic parties.  It was political convergence in the summer of 
1996 that helped to push through welfare reform, where intellectual consensus had left off.  So, 
where Teles concludes in early- to mid-1996 that welfare was doomed to the state governors’ 
waivers because the intellectual elites had insufficiently rallied behind the Republican’s 
congressional plan, we can see in hindsight that the consensus was strong and persistent enough 
to motivate Clinton to honor it by the end of the summer.70  
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“Negotiating Welfare Reform:  A Conventional Narrative Re-Visited” 
Chapter IV:  Negotiating Reform:  Advocates, Congress, and the White House 
 
Chapter II examined the congressional politics involved in settling on a welfare reform bill that 
could be included in the Republican Leadership’s ‘Contract with America’ before the run-up 
to the 1994 midterm election.  As was explained, this proved to be a difficult task, given the 
division within the Republican party about what the content of reform should be.  Generally, 
these policy-makers disagreed about whether the bill should emphasize work or target the 
increases in “illegitimacy” (or unwed pregnancy).  The Democratic coalition fared no better, 
as Clinton’s welfare taskforce muddled through with the assignment of sufficiently departing 
from the AFDC status quo without moving too far to the political right as to lose the support 
of the Democratic party.  The chapter suggested that the congressional and electoral dynamics 
are important in understanding the backlash theory, which holds that the Republicans’ 
monumental victory in achieving majorities in both houses (the first Republican Congress 
since the 80th of 1947-48) provided the necessary validation – and requisite numbers – to pass 
conservative welfare reform.  However, it was argued that this theory is incomplete because it 
does not account for the more complex dimensions of policy formation – how the 250 pages 
of Public Law 104-193, with its diverse features, came to pass. 
Chapter III posited the slightly altered theory of Steven Teles in order to account for 
the passage of PRWORA:  that the dissensual conflict of the intellectual elites was overcome 
by virtue of the consensus-building process of policy research.  In other words, the waivers 
authorized by the Department of Health and Human Services of the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton 
Administrations gave way to innovative state demonstrations, which contingently gave way to 
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policy examination and eventual ‘political learning.’  Such learning helped to narrow the range 
of acceptable measures involved in welfare reform, as this learning also helped to build upon, 
yet ultimately transcend, the ‘new consensus’ of the 1988 FSA.  What was clear from the 
chapter is that the intellectual elites disagreed based on the interaction of their cultural 
perspectives, but I suggested that the intellectual space of their conflict was much more tapered 
as it pertains to welfare reform:  on collectivist-liberalist grounds about proper societal 
commitment. 1   I argued that, over time, the intellectual elites aligned on the centrality of work 
in improving the welfare program, for which the ultimate goal (of course) was supporting its 
low-income clients. 
Despite this, the contention of this thesis on how we can view the politics of passing 
welfare reform needs refinement still.  To begin with, the forceful extent to which the elites 
coalesced behind the content of the 1996 welfare law is true insofar as some sort of work 
requirement was deemed crucial by mainstream participants.  This cannot be argued so boldly 
for the time-limitation provision (which importantly ended the entitlement nature of the 
program) or the measures to reduce “illegitimacy,” such as the Murray Light provisions of the 
‘family cap’ and teenage mother exclusion from welfare benefits, or even the direction of 
devolving the program to the states by means of a block grant.  These measures were fiercely 
disputed, and this can be seen most clearly vis-à-vis the conflict between the advocacy elites, 
																																																						
1 By ‘proper “societal” commitment,’ I mean several things.  First, ‘proper societal commitment’ refers to the 
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in lieu of the traditional word ‘social’ because I believe the former has taken on a meaning more precise and 
more useful (for my purposes) than the latter.  I am indebted to K. Karamanakis for forcing me to consider my 
words carefully, and to hone my meaning. Cf. Body Politics: What’s the State Got to Do With It?, J.A. Pino & 
K. Karamanakis, eds. (Chestnut Hill, MA: Eagle Print Collegiate Press, 2017), esp. “Ch. I: Editors’ Preface.” 
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especially before congressional committees, during the course of welfare reform’s policy 
formation.  
This is only one refinement among many.  Chapter IV endeavors to clarify the central 
argument of this thesis, which is the following:  The passage of PRWORA was not merely a 
product of conservative currents, nor was it a bipartisan convergence on a brand new welfare 
consensus.  Rather, the 1996 reform bill was informed by a panoply of actors, all of whom 
apprehended three contentions: (1) the status quo was insufficiently defensible, and thus 
program alteration was a given; (2) some sort of work requirement would be involved in any 
reform proposal, as the evidence suggested this was the best course-of-action for the program 
and its cash-aid recipients; and, (3) the additional features of reform would result from 
negotiation and bargaining between the actors involved, especially important after the 
Republicans won back the congress.  In short, contention (3) is the focus of this chapter.  It is 
too general to suggest that the elites converged, in a bipartisan manner, on the contents of the 
reform legislation – reform itself was a relational process whereby the measures proposed by 
policy-makers responded to (and built upon) each other.2  This refinement is clarified in the 
proceeding. 
Firstly, this chapter presents and considers testimonies before congressional 
committees to illustrate what actors (and evidence) influenced law-makers in the policy 
formation process.  Of course, as Weaver notes, the influence of actors such as child advocacy 
organizations or social conservative lobbyists “depends as much on the gatekeeping power of 
																																																						
2 Of course, Ron Haskins contends that the final legislation was in fact “highly bipartisan” and became “very 
popular among elected officials.”  He also suggests that PRWORA’s formation reflects something just short of 
an elite consensus or convergence.  See: Ron Haskins (2001), “Liberal and Conservative Influences on the 
Welfare Reform Legislation of 1996,” in For Better and For Worse: Welfare Reform and the Well-Being of 
Children and Families, Greg J. Duncan and P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, eds. (New York, NY: Russell Sage 
Foundation), pp. 17-9, 25. 
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elected officials in Washington as on changes in group involvement and group power.”3  In 
other words, the growing influence of social conservative testimony, for instance, partially 
reflects the preponderance of Republican power on committees such as Ways and Means.  This 
chapter seeks to isolate the factors that were of significance during welfare reform’s 
formulation.  It does so by considering the nature of the testimony first, and then it examines 
advocacy organizations. 
And secondly, this chapter documents the extensive negotiations that occurred within 
Congress and between it and the White House (in conjunction with various interest groups).  
Up until the early summer of 1996, many thought that welfare reform would remain an election 
issue.  It was due to a convergence of politics, as well as steady bargaining, that Clinton signed 
the legislation into law.  Many within his administration, such as the Assistant Secretary of 
Health and Human Services for planning and evaluation, Peter Edelman, urged Clinton to veto 
the Republican reform law for a third time.4  Instead, Clinton achieved a number of alterations 
to the bill so as to make it palatable for his ‘New Democratic’ approach.  One of these measures 
was expanded federal childcare funding, which fit snuggly into the priorities for welfare reform 
as articulated in the Democratic Leadership Council’s Mandate for Change (e.g., require 
welfare recipients to work, ‘make work pay’ through an expanded Earned-Income Tax Credit, 
and increase access to health care and childcare, as well as enhance child support 
enforcement).5  By signing, Clinton honored his campaign promise, but his administration 
																																																						
3  R. Kent Weaver (2000), Ending Welfare as We Know It (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press), p. 
217. 
4 Ibid., p. 202.  Recall that the first two reform bills that the Republican Congress sent to Clinton’s desk were 
vetoed for various political reasons.  See esp.: Jordan A. Pino, “Negotiating Welfare Reform: A Conventional 
Narrative Re-Visited,” Ch. II.  Also, see: Ch. IV, § NEGOTIATING REFORM.  
5 Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and William A. Galston (1993), “A Progressive Family Policy for the 1990s,” in Will 
Marshall and Martin Schram, eds., Mandate for Change (Berkley Books), pp. 153-78; my emphasis. 
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responded with varying degrees of satisfaction (Edelman promptly resigned, for instance).6  
The chapter seeks to close in on the date of passage – August 22, 1996 – and more clearly 
explain the nature of the elite convergence and the extensive negotiation that occurred to make 
welfare reform a reality.   
 
COMMITTEE TESTIMONY AND REFORM 
In a study prepared for delivery in 2006 to the American Political Science Association 
(convened in Philadelphia), Lawrence Mead analyzes the congressional politics involved in 
the “welfare revolution” of 1996.  Specifically, his study tracks the witnesses who appeared 
before congressional hearings during the policy formation process, and he documents the way 
in which they framed the agenda for reform.  Also, the study records the issues that the 
witnesses stressed as well as their positions.  Significant for my contention is Mead’s following 
assertion: 
The results reveal a shift away from ideological combat over the 
scale of government towards a cooler, more practical debate 
about how best to arrange welfare reform programs.  Less 
dramatically, opinion also shifts to the right on these issues.  Of 
the three theories of welfare reform politics, elitism appears 
strongest.7 
 
The following table (Table I) records the number of individuals within each group who 
appeared before such committees as the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and 
Means and the Senate Committee on Finance during six welfare reform periods.  The 
legislation acronyms should be recalled from Chapter I.8  Often times, members of these groups 
																																																						
6 Weaver, Ending Welfare as We Know It, p. 202. 
7 Lawrence M. Mead (2006), “Welfare Politics in Congress: Hearings” (Philadelphia, PA: Address to American 
Political Science Association), § ‘Abstract.’ 
8 ‘SSA’ refers to the social service amendments of 1962, which increased federal funding for services that could 
reduce dependency, such as childcare.  ‘WIN’ refers to the Work Incentive amendments of 1967, which created 
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would appear before smaller committees, such as the Subcommittee on Human Resources of 
the Committee on Ways and Means, that focus on more particular topics.   
Table I 
Number of Groups Represented in Each Welfare Reform Period 
9  
One significant feature of these numbers is the extent to which other members of 
Congress were involved in the deliberations as witnesses.  Nearly 30 percent of witnesses were 
other members during PRWORA’s formation.  Just over 20 percent of witnesses were activists, 
and just over 10 percent drew from think tanks.  This is important due to the large increases 
from the previous reform period (FSA, 1987-8), during which such representations were half 
as large.  This signifies, I would suggest, how critical this round of reform was – law-makers 
																																																						
the first work “requirements” through the instituting of stronger work incentives.  ‘FAP’ refers to the defeated 
Family Assistance Plan of 1969-72 that the Nixon Administration proposed for the ‘working poor’ in order to 
raise benefits.  ‘PBJI’ refers to the defeated Program for Better Jobs and Income of 1977-8 that the Carter 
Administration proposed in order to expand AFDC, federalize it, and move it closer to a work requirement 
orientation.  ‘FSA’ refers to the Family Support Act of 1986-8, which expanded welfare-to-work programs and 
enhanced child support enforcement.  And, of course, ‘PRWORA’ refers to the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1994-6 – the subject of this thesis.  See: Ibid., p. 14.  
9 Please note:  these figures and the table representation are taken from Lawrence Mead; see: Ibid., p. 18. 
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wanted to settle the problems of AFDC by ‘getting it right,’ so to speak.  And so, they ensured 
that many authorities were involved, including welfare recipients themselves.10 
Additionally, Mead notes that welfare reform during the 1980s and 1990s was different 
from that of the 1960s and 1970s, in that the latter displayed parties that were diverse 
ideologically.  This is because Congress was very seriously divided about poverty issues and 
the nature of the AFDC program.  Over time, he suggests, the parties became more cohesive 
ideologically, yet the critical difference between the two platforms became starker.  The 
division, especially between the two chambers, ensured that a wide variety of witnesses was 
called before the interested committees to testify about welfare reform.  This is important 
because it meant that a wide variety of views and evidence became a part of the public record.11  
Mead’s study codes the oral statements of every witness during the welfare period; it 
omits those of the committee members as well as their colloquies with the testifier.12  The study 
concludes that, over time, the agenda changed in a particular way:  ‘paternalist’ subjects 
increased in frequency as well as significance, and eventually overtook (what he calls) the 
“progressive”13 issue of scale-of-government.  (Recall that I suggested this matter is what had 
divided the elites and contributed to dissensual politics – their conflict on collectivist-liberalist 
grounds about proper societal commitment and the role of the federal government.)  So, for 
the FSA, the ‘new consensus’ on welfare was about crafting effective work programs, ensuring 
adequate social services, and enforcing child support collection, for instance.  These paternalist 
																																																						
10 See: Sandra O’Donnell, “Involving Clients in Welfare Policy-making,” Social Work 38.5 (Sept. 1993), pp. 629-
35. 
11 See: Mead, “Welfare Politics,” p. 17. 
12 Ibid., pp. 15-7. 
13 Mead uses the terms ‘progressive’ or ‘progressivism’ to indicate scale-of-government, or otherwise the space 
in which the questions ‘How much should the government do?’ or ‘What role should the federal government 
have in x matter?’ arise.  I do not use this term, as it is often held as equivalent, in the popular lexicon, to the 
word ‘liberal’ or at least convokes the appearance of a politically left perspective.  To avoid confusion, I replace 
‘progressive’ with the clearer signifier of ‘scale-of-government.’     
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matters were the central focus of the FSA and PRWORA reforms; however, scale-of-
government concerns “rebounded” in the 1996 policy formation process due to the sharp 
divergence of the federal government’s role in welfare by virtue of proposals for the program 
to become a block-grant to the states.14 
Also, elite-level opinion with respect to the agenda changed.  Mead’s study codes the 
witnesses’ positions according to a left-right ideological spectrum, as being the easiest way of 
tracking positions over time.  The analysis notes that testimony during the SSA through the 
FSA reform phases was resolutely to the political left, even while a diversity of ideological 
representation existed among the testifiers.  This changed in the PRWORA reform phase:  
nearly 50 percent of witnesses took a position ‘to the left’ on the lead issue cited; just under 50 
percent of witnesses took a position ‘to the right.’  Mead clarifies that opinion changes are less 
clear than agenda changes because the shifts depend on the issue type identified (i.e., 
paternalist versus scale-of-government, for example).  However, what is clear is that “left 
[scale-of-government] stances decline over time, while conservative paternalist positions 
grow.”15  Moreover, the overall percentage of witnesses who emphasized paternalist issues 
versus scale-of-government issues grew steadily over time, reaching a high of 85% during the 
FSA reform phase, slightly decreasing during the PRWORA phase.  The more ideological 
groups, such as activist, civil rights, and religious organizations, tended to emphasize scale-of-
government considerations consistently, but even they paid increasing attention to paternalist 
issues between the FSA and PRWORA reform phases.  Academics, think tanks, and 
administrators gave paternalist matters the most attention.16 
																																																						
14 Ibid., p. 19. 
15 Ibid., p. 23.  Also, see: Ibid., pp. 20-5. 
16 See: Ibid., pp. 27-9. 
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TESTIMONY SAMPLING 
Consider these trends according to a few, specific examples.  The first is a hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources, which occurred during the second session of the 103rd 
Congress on May 2, 1994.  The hearing was entitled “Florida’s Efforts to Reform Welfare,” 
and the members of the subcommittee went into the field and met in Tampa, Florida.   
This hearing is significant for at least two reasons.  First, it illustrates the trends above 
that have been documented by Mead’s study – for example, that paternalist issues of program 
improvement attained greater focus in the PRWORA reform phase (1994-96).  Second, though, 
is that the hearing demonstrates a central contention of Chapter III:  evidence from the states 
was instrumental in effectuating a convergence on the necessity of work as a condition of cash 
assistance.  This example illustrates the centrality of work participation for program 
administrators in Florida, but also it demonstrates the keenness of national policy-makers in 
learning from state demonstrations.   
The hearing reviews Florida’s initiatives to reform welfare programs through the 
“introduction of new job training and placement programs for AFDC recipients.”17  Testifying 
before the subcommittee were seven witnesses:  two administrators of the Florida Department 
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, two legal advocates of Florida Legal Services as well as 
Bay Area Legal Services, two former welfare recipients, and one state legislator.  I will not 
attempt to code their public remarks, but in broad characterizations, each spoke to the nature 
of the welfare program within the state as well as to its improvement.  Assistant Secretary 
																																																						
17 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Florida’s Efforts to Reform Welfare: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the 
Committee on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., May 2, 1994. DOI: 
http://congressional.proquest.com.proxy.bc.edu/congressional/result/congressional/pqpdocumentview?accoun
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Albertine McDaniel testified to the successes of ‘Project Independence’ – an FSA initiated 
JOBS program that was being evaluated by the MDRC.  Assistant Secretary McDaniel stated 
that “[t]he first year study with Project Independence actually showed that we improved the 
earning power of the treatment—Project Independence—group by about 11.2 percent over 
those who were not involved in Project Independence.”18  We cannot say with certainty that 
the committee members took the testimony of such actors, and the presentation of such 
evidence, as particularly significant; however, it is likely that the committee members were 
genuinely interested in discovery.  As the first and second focus points for the hearing of 
Chairman Harold Ford’s press release make clear, the members (perhaps the Democrats more 
so) were interested in state experiments in order to consider Clinton’s welfare reform proposal 
in particular: 
(1) What does Project Independence tell us about the 
effectiveness of a JOBS program that focuses on immediate job 
placement, compared with other approaches? What role does 
human capital development play in Project Independence? 
Based on experience under Project Independence and the two-
county demonstration, are most welfare parents job-ready?19  
 
(2) The Clinton Administration is considering phasing in its 
forthcoming time-limited welfare reform plan, starting with 
young welfare families. What information is available thus far 
from Project Independence or the two-county demonstration that 
would shed light on this possible phase-in strategy?20  
 
This subcommittee hearing should ground the general points cited above from Mead about the 
nature of welfare politics in the PRWORA phase.  The witnesses, perhaps due to the fact that 
this was a field hearing, all narrowly addressed matters related to paternalism – they were 
																																																						
18 Ibid., p. 9. 
19 Ibid., p. 3. 
20 Ibid. 
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interested in the cold particulars of program improvement, such as the features of this JOBS 
program.  None focused their remarks exclusively on scale-of-government concerns. 
 I present two additional examples that further illustrate Mead’s contention, which 
occurred in Washington, D.C. on welfare reform proposals, such as H.R. 4605, and the later 
proposals of 1995.  The first is again before the House Subcommittee on Human Resources, 
and it occurred over the course of July 14, 26-28, 1994.  The second hearing is before the 
Senate Committee on Finance, and it occurred on March 9, 1995. 
 The former hearing focused on examining welfare proposals of mid-1994, such as H.R. 
4605, the Work and Responsibility Act, which was proposed by the Clinton Administration 
after many months of planning and delay.  Appearing before the subcommittee were 11 witness 
panels.  I will not list each witness, but it bears mentioning here that over 20 members of 
Congress, several state and local bureaucrats, notable academics (such as Mary Jo Bane and 
David Ellwood), and senior administration officials (such as Secretary of the HHS Donna 
Shalala) all testified.  The subcommittee was convened in order to consider provisions for 
comprehensive reform of the welfare system, such as those to: “[r]equire states to develop for 
each welfare recipient the fastest possible plan to attain lasting employment and self-
sufficiency, and establish a two-year limit on cash assistance not contingent on work” as well 
as “[p]rovide grants to schools and community organizations to develop pregnancy prevention 
programs for unwed teens” and “[r]evise child care subsidies, earned income tax credits, and 
AFDC income disregards for JOBS/WORK program participants, and increase child care 
funding for working poor families.”21  These are just three of several objectives.  It should be 
																																																						
21 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Welfare Reform Proposals, Including H.R. 4605, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994: Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Human Resources of the Committee on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 
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noted also that they reflect not only typically Republican concerns, but also those of 
Democrats.  It is interesting that this was the focus of the hearing even though the agenda was 
formally controlled by Democrats, who were in the majority – Representative Sam Gibbons 
(D., FL) served as the Acting Chairman.  The purpose was to examine the administration’s 
welfare reform plan – the focus on work should again serve to emphasize how crucial the 
requirement was to all involved in the process. 
 The witnesses during this subcommittee hearing emphasized both paternalist and scale-
of-government issues.  Of course, Secretary Shalala, Dr. Bane, and Dr. Ellwood all focused 
their remarks on the merits of the administration’s welfare reform plan, and how it could 
address a number of problems with the contemporary system.  The later witnesses, especially 
the Republican members of Congress, noted scale-of-government concerns, especially 
Representative Bill Archer’s (R., TX) early points in the hearing about mid- to long-term 
growth in federal spending on welfare.  Representatives Rick Santorum (R., PA) and E. Clay 
Shaw (R., FL), in their capacities as witnesses, both sought to address these matters by 
highlighting H.R. 3500 – the Republican welfare reform plan that later became H.R. 4, one of 
the ten pillars of the Contract with America. 
 The final hearing that I discuss here occurred in early 1995 before the Senate 
Committee on Finance.  It serves to demonstrate Mead’s contention about the shifts in welfare 
politics, especially as it relates to the intellectual elites.  I utilize this hearing as an example, as 
opposed to one that illustrates the politics of the advocacy elites, because it shows clearly the 
division of opinion among the think tank policy wonks in this reform phase, and also because 
																																																						
July 14, 26, 27, and 28, 1994. DOI: http://congressional.proquest.com.proxy.bc.edu/congressional/docview/ 
t29.d30.hrg-1994-wam-0027?accountid=9673. 
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the advocacy elites tend to substantiate Mead’s contention less because they focus more 
narrowly on their particular interests (children, for example).  Appearing before the committee 
were Michael D. Tanner of the Cato Institute, Robert L. Greenstein of the Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, Robert E. Rector of the Heritage Foundation, and (naturally) Lawrence 
M. Mead of Princeton University.  Not surprisingly, each spoke to program improvement; 
effectuating a work orientation was a principal concern in all of the remarks.  However, Tanner 
tended to focus his remarks on the need to return the welfare program to the states, for which 
his remarks should be seen as principally about the scale-of-government.  Rector tended to 
focus more on the “illegitimacy” matter, and less on the need for reform to be about requiring 
work.  Greenstein agreed with Mead insofar as he thought welfare reform should be about 
“promoting work” (my emphasis) and “requiring responsibility of both parents,” but he 
stressed the typically Democrat position that reform must also maintain the “safety net for poor 
children.”22  Mead’s remarks should be no surprise at this juncture:  they focused on instituting 
nationally what he thought had been achieved in Wisconsin (a work orientation with sufficient 
state support).23  
While the testimonies of these witnesses serve to illustrate the partisan nuances of 
welfare reform, by no means should they substantiate a view that the perspectives were locked 
in irreconcilable conflict, even at this juncture.  Each commented on the need to improve the 
program in a particular regard (paternalist concerns), and each advocated a work requirement.  
As Haskins comments, “after 1992 the debate was about the amount of work required, the 
specific conditions of work[,] and the consequences for individuals and states of not working”:  
																																																						
22 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, Broad Policy Goals of Welfare Reform: Hearings before the 
Committee on Finance, 104th Cong., 1st sess., March 9, 1995, p. 6. DOI: http://congressional.proquest.com. 
proxy.bc.edu/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1995-fns-0049?accountid =9673. 
23 See: Ibid., pp. 1-11. 
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the debate occurred within a fairly circumscribed intellectual space.24  Yes, scale-of-
government was a recurring theme, as were “illegitimacy” matters and ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ 
sanctions (e.g., a time limitation for benefits); but, scale-of-government should not be 
considered the dominant theme of scrutiny.  As Mead summarizes, “it is far from the whole 
story.”25  He continues: “National politics moved to the right, but more important, policy 
experience and research encouraged a more practical and less ideological stance toward 
poverty.”26  Congressional hearings in this period should demonstrate that welfare reform 
politics had shifted, as had the agenda and elites’ opinions.  No longer were mainstream 
participants seriously debating expanding the welfare program, nor could they seriously expect 
to eliminate it.  Instead, “scale issues were mostly set aside in favor of pursuing the work goal, 
which the public strongly favored. Most groups involved in advising Congress shared in that 
change. Welfare became less of an ideological battle and more of a problem to be solved.”27  
 
THE INFLUENCE OF ADVOCACY ELITES 
This chapter has characterized broadly the shifts in committee testimony, and again this thesis 
has engaged with elite-level opinion.  A more thorough engagement with the advocacy elites 
is still required, however.  This is not least because the advocates failed to demonstrate Mead’s 
thesis to a considerable extent – they were, nevertheless, involved in the policy formation 
process.  I suggest that particularly important in the politics of welfare reform were two groups, 
which I consider here in turn.  Yet, the impact of their influence is disputed.28     
																																																						
24 Haskins, “Liberal and Conservative Influences,” p. 17. 
25 Mead, “Welfare Politics in Congress,” p. 37. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., pp. 37-8. 
28 Weaver, for instance, characterizes the influence of interest groups in the PRWORA welfare reform period as 
‘ambiguous’ at best.  See: Weaver, Ending Welfare as we Know It, pp. 217-21.  Sufficient evidence exists to 
argue both that specific groups exercised an influence and that they did not.  Certainly, though, it can be argued 
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First, I examine the influence exercised by social conservative groups or ‘pro-family’ 
groups or, some may characterize, the “religious right.”29  In short, these groups tended to see 
welfare reform as an opportunity to reverse American moral and social “decay” by (1) focusing 
on reducing “illegitimate” births and teen pregnancy in especial and (2) increasing the powers 
(flexibility) of the state governments vis-à-vis a block grant that would cap federal spending 
on the AFDC program.  Certainly, these groups were keen on limiting aid to two years, 
enforcing a work requirement, and stiffening child support enforcement as well – but they did 
not focus on these matters over the former.  Second, I review the influence of the child 
advocacy network in the policy formation process of PRWORA.  This entails a consideration 
of the Children’s Defense Fund, which requires an analysis of its failure to significantly alter 
the debate.  The degree to which it negotiated successfully is muted in this period of social 
policy reform. 
 Social conservative groups became especially involved in welfare reform in the 1990s, 
perhaps because they sensed an opportunity to expand the reach of their significance beyond 
the issues of abortion and school prayer.  Indeed, it was the former executive director of the 
Christian Coalition (a social conservative organization with a particularly strong local and state 
chapter base), Ralph Reed, who had urged other organizations to “cast a wider net” with their 
agendas.30  Additionally, of course, such organizations demonstrated their collective concern 
about the “breakdown of two parent families,” the “corrosive effects of out-of-wedlock births,” 
and “the broader process of social decay in America.”31  Groups such as the Christian 
																																																						
that interest groups exercised a degree of influence on the proceedings at moments during the process.  This is 
explored in the proceeding. 
29 Weaver, Ending Welfare as We Know It, p. 211. 
30 Ralph Reed, Jr., “Casting a Wider Net,” Policy Review 65 (Summer 1993), pp. 31-5.  Also, see: Weaver, Ending 
Welfare as We Know It, p. 212. 
31 Weaver, Ending Welfare as We Know It, p. 212. 
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Coalition, the Family Research Council, Focus on the Family, the Traditional Values Coalition, 
and Concerned Women of America began to rally behind deterrence-oriented welfare reform 
measures as solutions to the problems mentioned above.  They also believed that private 
charities and religious organizations, such as the Catholic Church, would be instrumental in 
promoting the “moral regeneration” required to change the lives of welfare recipients.32  Thus, 
they argued that their roles should be increased if any reform would have a meaningful 
impact.33 
 While social conservative groups were drawn towards welfare reform, their unity as a 
coalitional interest was undermined by the Murray Light deterrence strategies of the family 
cap and teenage mother exclusion from benefits.  This is to say that these positions were not 
universally accepted among social conservative organizations.  For example, the National 
Right to Life Committee opposed both of these measures.  NRLC believed that strong anti-
illegitimacy measures would increase the rate of abortions – a possibility the organization 
could not sanction.34  While this threatened fissure, social conservative groups were adept at 
working together because their policy shops were small, they all knew each other, and they 
had frequently worked together on issues of common interest and concern.35   
Of most importance is that these groups (besides the NRLC) successfully fought to 
keep Murray Light provisions in contention during the 103rd and (part of the) 104th Congresses.  
These organizations strengthened their ties to the most conservative Republican law-makers, 
and the former provided ammunition with which the latter could defend themselves.  For 
																																																						
32 Ibid., p. 213.  See, too: Ellen Reese (2007), “The Causes and Consequences of U.S. Welfare Retrenchment,” 
Journal of Poverty 11.3, p. 54. 
33 Weaver, Ending Welfare as We Know It, pp. 212-13. 
34 See: Ibid., p. 213. 
35 Ibid., pp. 213-5. 
		 73 
example, the Family Research Council published a number of short policy memoranda that 
conservative Republicans used to establish that the family cap would not lead to an increased 
number of abortions, as a state demonstration in New Jersey seemed to suggest.36  When the 
104th Congress came to session, social conservative organizations continued their support for 
deterrence strategies to reduce “illegitimacy”; however, Weaver notes that the coalition was 
only one interest (albeit a strong one) among many.  He is not as sanguine as others on these 
organizations’ collective influence.37  Indeed, they were ultimately placated, Weaver thinks, 
with increased abstinence education funding and rewards for states that could reduce the out-
of-wedlock birth rate without any uptick in abortion rates – provided that social conservative 
organizations accept, without protesting to their multi-million-person base, the family cap 
becoming a state option.38  According to Weaver, the compromise offered to these 
organizations ultimately had to be accepted by virtue of the reality that their power lay at one 
extreme of the Republican party.  Social conservative organizations had the capacity to keep 
strong deterrence measures in contention, but could not ultimately control the agenda.  The 
point raised at the beginning of the chapter bears repeating:  the influence of this coalitional 
interest group “depends as much on the gatekeeping power of elected officials in Washington 
as on changes in group involvement and group power.”39  It should be added that the power of 
social conservative groups also depends upon the relative power of other interests.  In this case, 
the Republican Leadership’s interests in passing reform while retaining office is a forceful one. 
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38 Weaver, Ending Welfare as We Know It, pp. 216-8. 
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Another interest group that will be considered here is the Children’s Defense Fund.  
The CDF is chosen for both proxy and idiosyncratic reasons.  At this time, it was one of the 
most powerful advocacy organizations from the progressive wing of the Democratic party; 
however, as was mentioned above, its influence in PRWORA’s formulation was especially 
muted.  This is not simply because of the midterm election results in 1994.  The CDF exercised 
limited influence because it was one of the few organizations that retained its commitment to 
both welfare benefit entitlement as well as a limited work orientation.  Due to the CDF’s 
predominant interest in advocating on behalf of children, any sanctions on parents (reflecting 
the recurring ‘dual-clientele’ trap) were suspect.  In fact, any material alteration that stood to 
reduce a family’s benefits was opposed.  This frustrated meaningful reform, even in the first 
two years of Clinton’s presidency, when the Democrats controlled the significant policy-
making committees in this regard.  And, from the perspective of moderates in both parties, the 
CDF’s unwillingness to compromise (as the Democratic Leadership Council was viewed to 
have done) further relegated the group to the sidelines.  
Historically, though, politicians pay attention to research and advocacy organizations 
in order to understand the impacts that proposed legislation would have on their constituencies.  
In the past fifty to sixty years, however, there has been an explosion in the number of interest 
groups, which has forced politicians to incorporate such organizations into the policy-making 
process, at least partially.  Some of these organizations consider themselves to be ‘public 
interest’ groups, while some are more precise about their concentrations.  Nevertheless, all 
such groups remind law-makers about the power they wield – their ability to cast politicians in 
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a particular light to influence elections.  Simply, law-makers cannot ignore interest groups, 
especially when they organize into an effective coalition.40 
When Republicans took back control of the Congress in 1994, they limited the entrée 
granted to progressive organizations in the policy formation process.  As the head of the Food 
Research and Action Center noted, some Republicans were “willing to dance with us, but the 
decisions to cut [had] already been made.”41  Progressive organizations continued to appear 
before Congress by virtue of the Democrats on the related committee, but their involvement in 
the day-to-day writing of welfare reform proposals was curtailed.  This is true for the more 
research-oriented groups to the political left, such as the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 
as well as the Center for Law and Social Policy, as it was true for the advocacy-oriented 
Children’s Defense Fund. 
The CDF emerged in the 1970s out of a coalition of groups all interested in children’s 
development issues.  Marian Wright Edelman set the agenda and brought these groups under 
one administration.  (The CDF takes no government funding, but instead relies upon the 
donations of wealthy individuals as well as foundations; it has an affiliated 501(c)(4) that 
grants it additional flexibility, such as for lobbying activities.42)  In comparison to the CBPP 
and CLASP, the CDF had an operating budget in 1996 of almost four times that of the former 
two, combined.43  However, the organization could exercise a limited influence with respect 
to mounting a publicity campaign when its suggestions in the policy formation process were 
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ignored.  Simply, it lacked the resources to work successfully in the position occupied – within 
a “reactive, defensive, and negative role.”44   
For example, the CDF focused on preventing the end of welfare as an entitlement to 
families, and it attempted to frustrate the effort to convert the program into a block grant.  
Because Republicans controlled the agenda after the 1994 elections, and these measures were 
on it, the CDF could only attempt to mitigate the perceived effects of these measures, such as 
by fighting for adequate child care funding or by weakening Murray Light provisions.45  With 
respect to this last element, interestingly the CDF established linkages with the NRLC and 
Catholic Charities, USA in order to increase its influence and advocate dropping the family 
cap.46  Despite ultimate success in this regard, Weaver observes that the CDF was doomed to 
the sidelines, once Democrats lost the driver’s seat on welfare reform, for a few reasons.  First 
is the obvious point that Democrats no longer enjoyed a majority in either chamber of congress.  
Second, the CDF could not muster a robust grassroots campaign to significantly alter welfare 
reform legislation.  And third, the CDF lacked reliable political allies at the notable policy-
formation ‘choke points’ – the related committees of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate as well as the White House.   
With respect to the latter, recall that the president was committed to enacting some sort 
of reform on welfare.  This produced an awkward reality for Marian Edelman, whose husband 
served in the Department of Health and Human Services.  This close personal linkage between 
the Edelman’s and the Clinton’s (additionally, Hillary Clinton was a former chairman of the 
CDF’s Board of Trustees) seemingly should have resulted in greater effect.  When the 
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Congress sent Clinton its third welfare reform bill, Marian Edelman urged the president to veto 
it again.  She protested, after his signature, that the legislation “makes a mockery of his pledge 
not to hurt children. … It will leave a moral blot on his presidency and on our nation that will 
never be forgotten.”47  Perhaps the CDF’s failure to exercise significant influence is due, in 
part – as Weaver notes about the dominant opinion among Republican policy-makers – to 
Edelman’s “tone of moral superiority.”48  She and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D., NY)  
made the ultimate welfare reform legislation about morality, support for it a Manichean choice 
between ‘good’ and ‘evil.’49  For compromise-oriented moderates – like President Clinton, 
Representative Shaw, and Senator Lott – this perspective must have been nauseating. 
 
NEGOTIATING REFORM 
In the remainder of the chapter, I explain the final passage of PRWORA by paying attention 
to the negotiation and bargaining that occurred in the final year and a half of policy formation.  
Certainly, I cannot cover all of the details of the legislation’s formulation.  What’s more: it 
would remain irrelevant to my argument if I attempted to do so.  Instead, this section focuses 
on the role of the state governors in promoting and then reviving welfare reform.  It should be 
noted that the Republican Governors Association (RGA) and the National Governors 
Association (NGA) became key players (and negotiators).  This section shows how welfare 
reform was a relational process whereby all of the interested parties (Congressional Democrats 
and Republicans, the White House, the state governors, &c.) responded to each others’ 
positions, in a back-and-forth manner, in order to achieve a palatable product.  The enormous 
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degree of bargaining between the actors should reveal a timeless tendency of American 
politics:  legislation is the result of negotiation and compromise. 
 When the Republican leadership settled on the Contract with America, of which the 
Personal Responsibility Act (H.R. 4) was a crucial element, Republican policy-makers were 
trying to achieve a variety of goals.  Overall, the Contract with America reflects an ideological 
commitment to reducing the size of the federal or national government, especially the vast 
array of its welfare programs.  So, the modus operandi of the ‘Republican Revolution’ was, of 
course, deficit reduction and balanced budgets.  The Republican leadership (Speaker Newt 
Gingrich, personally) was influenced by the writings of welfare analyst, Robert Rector, of the 
Heritage Foundation, who argued that the entire spectrum of means-tested programs (75 in 
total) should be considered together as “welfare.”  He believed that these programs’ total 
spending of $5.4 trillion (1993 dollars) since 1963 represented the failure of the ‘Great Society’ 
initiative, since poverty had not changed in step.  Regardless of whether this claim is believed, 
Republicans seized on his figure, and reform of the AFDC program became a proxy issue.50 
 Since the Clinton Administration’s welfare initiative failed in the summer of 1994, the 
field of reform was open to H.R. 4, what became the Personal Responsibility Act of 1995.  It 
reflected a more conservative vision of welfare reform, partly because the Republicans who 
were involved in its formulation had moved to the political right in order to differentiate their 
bill from the president’s.51  The PRA included provisions that would have ended the 
entitlement status of the program, imposed an aggregate spending cap, and permitted states to 
convert their AFDC grants into block grants to design their own programs to serve low-income 
families.  It also included a number of new mandates, with which many of the state governors 
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took issue.  For instance, under the PRA, states would be required to exclude from eligibility 
of AFDC benefits (1) all children for whom paternity had not been established, (2) all children 
born to mothers under the age of 18, and (3) all children born to mothers who were receiving 
AFDC benefits at the time of pregnancy.  Additionally, states were required to meet escalating 
‘work participation rates’ for certain welfare recipients, and for these expensive new work 
programs only $10 billion of new funding would be devoted, at the federal level.  Single-parent 
recipients were required to work for at least 35 hours, and states were expected to help provide 
assistance for transportation, supervision, and child care – all costly expenses.52  
 As Republican Governor John Engler of Michigan quipped, “[c]onservative 
micromanagement is just as bad as liberal micromanagement.”53  The governors – particularly 
Republican governors such as Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin, John Engler, and Bill Weld 
of Massachusetts at this stage – objected to the limited discretion and funding accompanying 
an increased set of demands on state governments.  The governors were worried about 
micromanagement, but also about across-the-board cuts to federal funds, which would affect 
states and populations indiscriminately.54  While the PRA contained provisions to extend a 
degree of flexibility to the states, it was actually rather close to being “the states’ worst 
nightmare”: it added a number of new mandates, some expensive, while capping funding for 
AFDC and other programs.55  As Weaver put it, the incentives were very high for the governors 
to push welfare reform in a direction other than the PRA.  
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And, the governors were able to exercise a decisive influence in transforming the PRA 
into a bill more broadly acceptable to a coalition of interests.  At first, as was indicated above, 
the Republican governors led the way because a bipartisan position could not be achieved by 
the NGA.  Rather, the RGA took a more involved role in working with the Republican 
Congress on altering the PRA.  House Republicans also had strong incentives themselves to 
secure the consent of governors, who could “ease passage of their ambitious program,” which 
extended beyond just reform of AFDC.56  So, House Republicans and Republican governors 
began negotiating the contents of the welfare reform law in Williamsburg, Virginia shortly 
after the election of 1994.  They were able to agree on several alterations.  The resulting bill 
achieved “more flexible work requirements,” in exchange for “a basic family assistance block 
grant with no increases in nominal funding levels.”57  This reflects the governors’ interests in 
achieving greater discretion, and the Republican congressional interests in limiting federal 
spending growth.  While the governors and the Republican leadership struck this agreement, 
Ron Haskins notes that the normal operation of policy-making still applied:  “no matter what 
the governors or Gingrich or Dole might propose, Shaw and Archer controlled the drafting and 
would not accept any bill that would not keep our various factions united.”58  This complicated 
matters.  Work requirements were ‘ratcheted up’ as the bill moved through the House, while 
both parties castigated each other for being ‘weak on work.’59  This seems to reflect that work 
was central to meaningful reform.  In March of 1995, the House of Representatives passed a 
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59 Weaver, “Deficits and Devolution,” p. 60. 
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bill that retained the contours of the agreement between the Republican governors and 
congressional leadership. 
The bill proceeded much more slowly in the Senate, where the Republican governors’ 
“desire for more discretion” was expected to fare better.60  Interestingly, because President 
Clinton had refused to comment on whether he would veto a bill that dropped the individual 
entitlement status of AFDC, advocacy groups stopped fighting for it and began a pivot towards 
bargaining for increased child care funding for women subjected to a work requirement.61  
Other debates raged on in the many months during which the Senate underwent the markup 
process.  Conservative senators and social conservative groups, such as those examined above, 
continued to lobby for provisions to reduce “illegitimacy”; large-states’ senators worried about 
the specifics of the funding formulae by which their constituencies would received matching 
federal monies.  Finally, in a series of floor votes in September of 1995, these matters were 
settled, and the Senate legislation passed 87-12 – due in part to a tip-of-the-hat from Clinton, 
that he might approve welfare reform along the lines of the Senate product.62  Importantly, the 
Senate version of welfare reform retained the block grant nature of the new program as well as 
the stronger work requirements, imposed a time limitation, but dropped the “illegitimacy” 
measures to state options.  It also honored the requests of some politically left advocacy 
organizations, Democratic senators, and the White House on a strengthened maintenance-of-
effort requirement for state spending, a more generous “rainy day” fund for states encountering 
recession, and greater child care funding.63   
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Despite this seemingly bipartisan achievement in the Senate, House Republicans were 
not content with some of the departures from their version of welfare reform.  Ultimately, the 
reconciliation process resulted in a conference agreement that Clinton rejected … twice.  The 
legislation increased the burden on states to achieve welfare-to-work transitions, and it 
implemented a “classic congressional strategy” on the anti-illegitimacy measures of “splitting 
the difference”:  states would have to opt out of family caps through a vote of the state 
legislatures, but could opt into teen mother exclusion from benefits.  This unnerved the 
Administration.  Clinton also protested that the bill was “designed to meet an arbitrary budget 
target rather than to achieve serious reform.”64   
After the breakdown in these negotiations, most thought that welfare reform was dead.  
However, as Haskins put it, a deus ex machina appeared in the form of the governors.65  They 
were able to “breathe life” back into welfare reform.  Whereas the winter 1995 meeting of the 
NGA failed to result in a bipartisan compromise on welfare reform, the February meeting was 
more successful.  Republican and Democratic governors were able to agree on a package of 
reforms to AFDC as well as Medicaid.66  This augured poorly for the Clinton Administration, 
which then would have less political clout in rejecting resultant legislation – it is difficult for 
an administration to reject the bipartisan position of the NGA.  Largely, the governors’ 
agreement was a sketchy set of improvements on the previous conference package that Clinton 
had rejected.  The package increased the monetary flexibility of the states:  whereas the 
conference agreement was set to achieve federal savings of $60.4 billion, the governors’ 
package would achieve $43 billion of reductions.  It also increased the flexibility of states 
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while raising the funds available to them (e.g., an additional $1 billion contingency, “rainy 
day” fund).  A notable dynamic in play here is that the governors were responding to the 
budgetary uncertainty that the breakdown in negotiations between the White House and 
Congress had caused – “for all governors, prolonged uncertainty meant that their own state 
budgets would be based on guesswork.”67  This “governance dilemma” was unacceptable to 
Republican and Democratic governors alike.68  Ultimately, the NGA provided the bargaining 
chip with which the actors could legitimize the “extreme” Republican welfare-reform 
package.69  Democrats achieved increased child care funding, state maintenance-of-effort, and 
a larger contingency fund, among other provisions; Republicans were able to pass a block grant 
of a major welfare state program, time-limit benefits, and control federal spending for the 
course of the foreseeable horizon.  Both sides were able to be ‘tough on work’ by requiring 
satisfactory work participation rates of the states as well as by providing for a work requirement 
as a condition of aid.  Last, illegitimacy-reduction measures were subjected to the “Byrd rule” 
in the Senate budget reconciliation process.70  In other words, they were dropped, forcibly, to 
state options.71 
 Haskins comments, from his vantage point on Ways and Means, that the large 
difference between 1995 and 1996 with respect to welfare reform is the “willingness of the 
two parties to cooperate in perfecting the bill.”72  He thinks that it was the NGA that exercised 
the decisive influence in reviving and promoting welfare reform, as House Democrats had 
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difficulty maintaining partisan positions when influential leaders of the party appeared before 
the committees in support of the redesigned conference agreement.73  Advocates also could 
not challenge the unified influence of the governors, even though they tried in the weeks after 
the February 1996 compromise.  Republican governors tended to note the significance of 
bipartisan agreement; Democratic governors tended to follow the line of Florida Governor 
Lawton Chiles (D.) – “The perfect is always a problem for the good.”74  We might see the 
dynamics in play as a matter not simply relegated to the realm of politics, however.  There 
seemed to have been a fundamental, ideological coherence about the contours of the reform 
legislation, and other factors (such as greater funding or state discretion or “anti-illegitimacy” 
measures) could be negotiated.  In this way, the direction of reform was set, but the road upon 
which it would travel needed to be built – piece by piece – in order to arrive at the date of 
Clinton’s signing the legislation into law:  August 22, 1996. 
*       *       *   
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“Negotiating Welfare Reform:  A Conventional Narrative Re-Visited” 
Chapter V:  Conclusion:  Welfare Reform as Public-Elite Alignment 
 
This thesis began by documenting the political and electoral currents that gave rise to the 
unexpected and, indeed, remarkable victory of the Republican Party in claiming both chambers 
of Congress in 1994.  This was the first Republican Congress since the 80th of 1947-48, which 
meant that key committee chairmanships transferred parties, the agenda changed, and 
Republican policy-makers could shed the role of the opposition so as to finally legislate on 
their own terms.  In Chapter II, the significance of the ‘Contract with America’ was examined 
and so was the political bargaining among Republicans to settle behind H.R. 4 (the tenth pillar 
of the contract) as the welfare reform bill to challenge the administration’s plan.  While a 
difficult exercise among conservative and moderate Republicans to maintain unity behind one 
set of proposals, the bill’s “validation” by the electorate in the 1994 midterm election suggests 
the backlash account to understand the politics of welfare reform passage.  In other words, ‘the 
Republican Revolution’ is what ensured that conservative welfare reform would transpire.  I 
argued that while this theory is not wrong, it is incomplete:  it fails to offer an adequate 
explanation of the more complex dimensions of policy formation.  For instance, it is unable to 
account for the trends in committee testimony that Lawrence Mead documented in his 2006 
study – ‘paternalist’ topics of program improvement were considered in greater proportion 
than during other welfare reform periods, and typically conservative positions were delivered 
before the committees in equal proportion as typically progressive positions.1  Furthermore, all 
of the actors involved, including the intellectual and advocacy elites, were committed to a 
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stronger work requirement than the one instituted by the Family Support Act of 1988.  This 
was noted as the substance of a barebones elite consensus. 
Recall from Chapter III that Steven Teles argued: “If substantial change in AFDC does 
occur, it will be largely the result of a shift in the orientation of a portion of the nation’s 
intellectuals.”2  He meant by this that welfare reform was embroiled in ‘dissensus politics’ 
whereby the elites – the nation’s intelligentsia, including its law-makers and interest group 
advocates – were stuck in an irreconcilable conflict due to their cultural orientations.  Thus, 
the hierarchists opposed the reform formulations of the individualists and those of the 
egalitarians, and vice versa.  I demonstrated how this conflict led to a widening chasm in the 
intellectual communities, in which progressive academics tended to cloister themselves within 
the universities and conservative thinkers were drawn to the increasingly active think tanks in 
Washington, D.C.  Additionally, foundations started to take a greater role in funding research 
to align with a particular ideological perspective. This lack of agreement, under any 
permutation, meant that meaningful reform legislation, along the lines of what the public had 
endorsed for years, would never manifest.  As was noted in the chapter, policy change occurs 
when elite consensus matches the public consensus.   
 However, as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996 attests, meaningful reform of welfare did manifest, and I argued in this thesis that it was 
due to the overcoming of ‘dissensus politics.’  Passage of PRWORA, by virtue of its 
occurrence, is not sufficient for the argument that dissensus politics was overcome; however, 
it is a necessary condition.  Nevertheless, I suggested that state demonstrations were 
instrumental in forging the contours of a consensus (or otherwise building on the loosely-
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contended ‘new consensus’ of the previously passed FSA of 1988).  The waivers authorized 
by the department of health and human services of the Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Clinton 
administrations led to innovative programs in the various states, the ‘laboratories of 
democracy.’  These state demonstrations, due in part to evaluation authorizations under the 
FSA, were examined closely for results, and this process led to ‘political learning.’  For 
example, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, under the leadership of Judith 
M. Gueron, conducted a number of evaluations that contributed to the policy literature about 
welfare programs that required work or subjected recipients to a time-limitation of aid.  This 
vast repertoire of policy research was utilized heavily in the PRWORA’s formulation, but its 
greatest impact was in shaping elite opinion in the years before the legislation’s passage.  
Thereby, social science evidence fueled a convergence of sorts that narrowed the chasm 
mentioned above.  I also noted, specifically, the impact of Wisconsin, which led the nation in 
developing, implementing, and evaluating innovative AFDC programs in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  Wisconsin became the touchstone of the welfare reform policy formation process. 
 Chapter IV suggested that it was too bold, however, to assert that passage of PRWORA 
reflects a brand new consensus on welfare, although Ron Haskins contends that the passage of 
welfare reform should be seen as something ideologically coherent and near a consensus.3  
Instead, I argued, the evidence suggests that the intellectual elites converged especially on the 
necessity of the work requirement for meaningful reform of AFDC.  I cited think tank scholars 
and academics to establish this point, and I reviewed committee testimony that supported 
Mead’s study as well as my contention.  Additionally, the political actors involved in the policy 
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formation process continuously castigated each other for being ‘weak on work.’  In this way, 
work requirements were incrementally ‘ratcheted up.’ This appeared to establish welfare 
reform’s centering on work. 
Nonetheless, ending entitlement, altering federal funding formulae for matching state 
spending on the AFDC program, mandating strengthened state ‘maintenance of effort,’ 
increasing child care funding for women subjected to the work requirement, and other matters 
were all negotiated fiercely.4  I described two groups that exercised a degree of influence in 
shaping the reform legislation, but who ultimately could not control the agenda.  The first were 
social conservative organizations, such as the Christian Coalition or the Family Research 
Council.  During the welfare reform deliberations, these groups sought to emphasize out-of-
wedlock births and the need to reverse America’s “social decay.”  In defining the contents of 
reform, they seized onto “anti-illegitimacy” measures, such as the family cap or teenage mother 
exclusion from benefits.  Ultimately, their influence waned as more moderate actors dictated 
the agenda.   
The second group was defined by proxy – the more progressive advocacy organizations 
such as the Children’s Defense Fund.  The CDF sought to resist the end of AFDC entitlement 
status and its transformation into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.  The CDF also 
fought for larger state contingency funds, in the event of recession, as well as higher federal 
funds to support child care.  The influence of the CDF was particularly muted during 
formulation of PRWORA because the Democrats did not control the agenda, the president’s 
‘New Democrat’ approach departed from the CDF’s governing philosophy, and the CDF did 
																																																						
4 For a brief summary of the provisions included in PRWORA, see: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional 
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not reflect the dominant beliefs about the content of welfare reform.  In the most decisive 
expression, the CDF was sidelined when President Clinton bucked the recommendation of the 
husband of the CDF president, Assistant Secretary of the HHS Peter Edelman, and signed 
PRWORA.  Despite the ‘ambiguous’ influences of these two advocacy elites, I argued that we 
should see the final legislation as ultimately a compromise mutually palatable to the actors 
involved.  
 The chapter also stressed that it was the nation’s governors who resurrected welfare 
reform after the Clinton Administration and the Republican Congress reached an impasse on 
budgetary negotiations in early 1996.  Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin, John Engler of 
Michigan, and Bill Weld of Massachusetts influenced the initial formulation of the welfare 
reform legislation by easing the impact it would have on the various state governments – these 
Republican governors were responsible for increasing state flexibility, reducing the new 
mandates of the bill, and ensuring deficit reduction did not mean an across-the-board cut to 
federal funds spent on AFDC.  Later on, the influence of the Republican Governors 
Association was overtaken by the decisive influence exercised by the National Governors 
Association, which was able to endorse a slightly altered conference agreement that the 
Congress had endorsed, but President Clinton had vetoed, twice.  This round of negotiations 
was critical to forging a compromise that would be mutually palatable at all of the ‘choke 
points’ of legislating.  The NGA exercised the ‘decisive influence’ or the instrumental 
‘bargaining chip,’ as I called it, due to the organization’s bipartisan nature.  Its endorsement 
frustrated successive politics, especially so for House Democrats and the White House, both 
of which were unable to depart significantly from the NGA-altered conference agreement 
without appearing excessively partisan.      
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FINAL REMARKS   
With these topics reviewed, what was the point of this thesis?  The conventional narrative of 
the welfare reform legislation of 1996 has been that it was a product of conservative electoral 
revolution and also the convergence of political interests (i.e., President Clinton’s re-election 
calculation and Congressional Republicans’ desire to fulfill the ‘Contract with America’).  In 
a final expression, this narrative is incomplete.  It ignores the substantial convergence of the 
intellectual elites on the necessity of a work requirement for meaningful reform, and it also 
ignores the degree to which the ancillary contents of reform (such as child care funding, time 
limitation, contingency funding, &c.) needed to be negotiated among the actors involved.  In 
addition, in this thesis, I credited the governors for exercising a decisive influence in 
‘promoting’ and ‘reviving’ welfare reform.  Their role should not be ignored, nor forgotten.   
Lawrence Jacobs argued that “public opinion is most influential in directing policy 
deliberations when it is unambiguous and strong.”5  As we have seen, this is the case, but policy 
change cannot transpire without elite opinion aligning with public opinion.  Sometimes the 
political parties in the United States have deeply-held philosophical differences, but as an 
American Enterprise Institute/Brookings Institution work group paper noted: “research also 
shows that the mere fact that one party proposes an idea can motivate partisans on the other 
side to dismiss it.  And yet, points of agreement are emerging that could serve as a foundation 
for consensus.”6  On welfare reform, ‘dissensus politics’ was tamed and points of consensus 
brought into greater focus.  What this will mean for contemporary politics I will leave for the 
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		 91 
reader to divine, but at the very least our refined narrative of welfare reform seems to suggest 
that: (1) government assistance must accord with the values of opportunity, responsibility, and 
security; and, (2) the modus operandi of American policy-making will always be compromise 
and negotiation. 
*       *       * 
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